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FRUSTRATION OF CONTRACT: COMPARATIVE
LAW ASPECTS OF REMEDIES IN CASES
OF SUPERVENING ILLEGALITY
LEO M. DRACHSLER

GOVERNMENT intervention in private commercial agreements has
become a familiar post-war economic phenomenon. One prolific
source of supervening events which disrupts contractual relationships
during the course of performance has been the embargo on shipments
to proscribed countries, coupled with imposition of export licensing
requirements. Recently there have been brought into sharper focus
certain interesting juridical by-products, stemming from the effects
of such subsequent illegality, upon the rights and obligations of parties
to sales contracts who claim discharge because they have been prevented from achieving the purposes for which each entered into the
agreement.
In such situations, it matters little to what rubric the facts are
assigned or which brocard is invoked-whether the applicable doctrine is claimed to be "discharge by frustration of purpose," or whether
appeal is made to "impossibility of performance by reason of supervening illegality," or "failure of consideration."' Taxonomic efforts
LEO M. DRAscHLER is a Member of the New York and Federal Bars.
1 "Whether you call it impossibility of performance or frustration, the result is the
same. In either event, the court will imply a condition excusing both parties from
performance and the contract may be wholly dissolved or operation under the contract
suspended, depending on the facts of the particular case. .. ." MINTON, C.J., in Patch
v. Solar Corp. 149 F. 2d 558, 559 (7th Cir. 1945); cert. denied, 326 U. S. 741, 66 S. Ct.
53; 90 L. Ed. 442, citing REsTATEmENT, CoTRAc s, § 288, "Frustration of the object
or effect of the contract," which reads:
"Where the assumed possibility of a desired object or effect to be attained by either
party to a contract forms the basis on which both parties enter into it, and this object or effect is or surely will be frustrated, a promisor who is without fault in causing
the frustration and who is harmed thereby, is discharged from the duty of performing
his promise unless a contrary intention appears."
See, also, Jackson & Co. v. Royal Norwegian Government, 177 F. 2d 694 (2d Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 339 U. S. 914 (1950), in which JUDaE CL.AR stated: "Here the parties, the Court below and the State Court have framed the issue in terms of 'frustration' of a contract, but that, as Professor Corbin has said, may be 'only perpetuating
The performance itself has become imthe use of a bad term to state the result' ....
possible."
Semantic wrangling over the precise substantive content of "frustration" once more
confirms Kantorowicz's gibe that "Rechtswissenschaft ist Wortwissenschaft." Pound,
Some Thoughts About Comparative Law, 1 FESTSCHRIFT FOR ERNST RABEL 7 (Germany
1954).
McNiR, LEGAL E-c-s or WAR, 151 (3d ed. Cambridge 1948) states: ". . . There
can be no doubt that the balance of judicial authority is in favor of the implied terms
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are of little use to courts confronted by the concrete task of equitably
readjusting the relations of the parties where they have failed to provide their own method of rearranging their obligations upon the happening of an unforeseen event.
It is beyond the scope of this sketch to make any comparison
between the theoretical foundations and present status of the doctrines
of frustration and impossibility of performance in Anglo-American law
and their juristic counterparts or analogues in civil law countries.
These observations will be confined to a review of the remedial modalities of this problem found at present in some representative legal
systems.2
as the basis of the doctrine of frustration and history appears to be on that side. If
you regard the doctrine as a development of the rule as to supervening impossibility
S.. or if you prefer to trace a different and more distinctly mercantile pedigree of the
doctrine, we suggest that you will be led to the same conclusion .... "
In Swift Canadian Co. v. Banet, 224 F. 2d 36 (2d Cir. 1955), there was no mention of frustration by the Court or parties. A Canadian seller of pelts to an American buyer was prevented from delivering the balance of a shipment by reason of a
regulation of the United States Bureau of Animal Industry stiffening import requirements. The contract, however, called for "F. 0. B. Toronto" to Philadelphia via railroad, and stated that risk of loss and title passed to buyer when the product was
loaded at seller's plant. The buyer pleaded "excuse from performance" because of the
governmental regulation. The Court construed "F. 0. B. Toronto" as merely a shipping instruction which was complied with by seller when he notified buyer of readiness
to place balance of pelts on car at Tortonto; that the "rest of the world was
free to the buyer as destination for the shipment," despite the inability to ship into
the United States; that the seller, having performed or indicated his readiness to perform by placing the goods on a car for shipment, was entitled to consider the contract breached upon refusal of buyer to accept delivery, and that the seller properly disposed of the goods to another buyer and could claim the difference in price as
damages.
6 CORBIn, CoNTRAcTs, 254-256 (St. Paul 1950) warns against confusing, equating,
or identifying "impossibility of performance of a promise" with "frustration of the
purposes for which a contract was made," a tendency which he claims is characteristic
of English judges. Some American courts also continue to assert that the "essential
element in every case involving frustration is impossibility of performance." 119 Fifth
Avenue Inc. v. Taiyo Trading Co., 73 N. Y. S. 2d 774 (1st Dep't 1947), aff'd, 275 App.
Div. 695, 87 N. Y. S. 2d 430 (1st Dep't 1949). Others say the doctrine is akin to "impossibility of performance, though frustration is not a form of impossibility." Lloyd v.
Murphy, 25 Cal. 2d 48, 153 P. 2d 47 (1944).
Professor Patterson has suggested that the term "constructive condition" replace
"implied condition," since the latter has been used to designate the proposition that
a promisor is excused by "impossibility of performance" as well as by "untoward frustration of his purpose." "By assigning to both frustration of performance and frustration of purpose the logical form 'constructive condition of frustration,' we can indicate the common criteria of the facts which give rise to each." Patterson, Constructive Conditibns in Contracts, 42 COL. L. Rxv. 903, 954 (1942).
2 The parent monographs on this subject-the series of sketches on frustration and
its treatment in foreign legal systems, have been heavily relied upon for the framework
of this article. See 28, 29 J. Comp. LEG. & LNT'L. L. (3d Ser.) 1946, 1947. See, also,
Gottschalk, ImIossIBrLIY oF PERORMANC-E IN CoNRmAcT (London 1938), which con-
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How and under what circumstances do courts in both common
law and code jurisdictions, when handling cases of sales transactions,
which have become aborted by supervening government decree, allo-

cate the risks and split the losss among the parties? What is the
nature and scope of judicial revision in applying remedies in cases
where the transaction turned sour?
I.

ANGLO-AMERICAN REMEDIES IN FRUSTRATED
INTERNATIONAL SALES AGREEMENTS

as a useful point of departure is the case of Aitorg
Trading Corp. v. Miekle PrintingPress and Mfg. Co.'
This decision represents an interesting development of the remedy of restitution of installment payments in the context of a partly
performed international sales transaction.
The Soviet trading agency in New York contracted for thirty
printing presses for export to and use in Russia. Ten presses were
accepted and paid for. A pre-payment of 25 % was made on the purchase price of the remaining twenty. Prior to delivery of the twenty
presses, federal regulations were promulgated under which Aintorg
was denied an export license.
Armtorg then rejected tender of the presses from the manufacturer. The manufacturer subsequently sold them to the United States
Government at a price considerably above the contract price to Amtorg.
The Court of Appeals held that Amtorg was a defaulting purchaser and was entitled under the New York Statute4 to restitution of
its payments in excess of damage caused to the seller by the breach,
SERVING

tains in the Appendix, 125-142, an excellent summary of impossibility of performance
doctrine as found in Roman-Dutch, German and French law. The task here has been
merely to review what courts in various systems do to "salvage a transaction gone
sour," because of the occurrence of unforeseeable inhibitive factors, how courts redress
the balance between the parties, restore the status quo. See 6 CORBIN, CoNTRACTs 256
(St. Paul 1950): ". . . The problem is that of allocating in the most generally satisfactory way the risk of harm and disappointment that result from supervening events
... " But such "judicial allocation" poses fundamental issues of the scope of judicial discretion or intervention in the commercial contract field. "For in the final
analysis, the entire problem of fixing the limits within which parties who have not
expressly stated them, shall be excused from performance, is not solely one of theoretical concept, nor of logical deduction, but more so perhaps, than we care to articulate,
one of public policy. . . ." Rothschild, The Doctrine of Frustration or Ipplied Condition in the Law of Contracts, 6 TEmPLE L. Q. 337-356, 338 (1932).
3 Amtorg Trading Corp. v. Miehle Printing Press & Mfg. Co., 206 F. 2d 103 (2d
Cir. 1953).
4 N. Y. Personal Property Law § 145(a).
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but rejected its claim to recovery of the profits realized by the seller
from the resale based on "frustration of the contract." 5
5 This result exemplifies a tendency of some American Courts to mitigate the
harshness of the general rule which refuses any relief to a defaulting vendee of personal property, by allowing recovery of his down payment (where the breach is unintended or insignificant) based on some equitable ground such as unjust enrichment,
mutual recission, divisibility of contract, etc. See Note, Broudy, Sales-Right of Vendee to Recover Down Payment After Defaulting on Contract to Purchase Goods,
11 WASH. & Lan L. REv. 269, 277 (1954). See, also, Note, St. Antoine, RestitutionUnjust Enrichment-Right of Defaulting Purchaserto Recover Part Payment, 52 MICH.
L. Rav. 928 (1954).
For a discussion of the break the Court in the Amtorg case made from Erie v.
Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1937), in refusing to follow
New York State case law, which prior to the amendment of the N. Y. Personal Property Law, § 145(a), permitting defaulting buyers to obtain restitution of pre-payments
in excess of the seller's damages, did not sanction such restitution, see Note, Perillo,
Federal Practice-Diversity of Citizenship: Federal Court's Power to Disregard Old
Decisions of Highest State Court, 39 CoRNELL L. Q. 736 (1954). It is the court's bold
assertion that it would follow the amended Statute (and not the previous New York
case law) as declaratory of the applicable New York law, which constitutes the major
impact of the case. Though Amtorg was awarded its down payments in excess of damages to the seller, Cr.A , C. J., at 105, rejected its claim to recovery based on "frustration of contract," since New York, as well as Federal case law, are identical on
the point, viz: The risk of frustration (of his "ultimate" purpose) is in the circumstances on the buyer. And failure to obtain an export permit does not make performance impossible. 6 CoRBIN, CoNMACTs, 354, 356 (St. Paul 1950). See, Gillespie v.
Ormsby, 126 Cal. App. 2d, 272 P. 2d 949 (1954); Baetjer v. New England Acohol Co.,
319 Mass. 592, 66 N. E. 2d 798 (1946); Cooper v. Mundial Trading Co., 105 Misc. 378,
172 N. Y. S. 378 (1918). "Frustration" was rejected as a defense in the absence of an
express provision that performance is conditional on obtaining an export permit and
part payment was not recovered. Bardons & Oliver, Inc. v. Amtorg Trading Corp.,
123 N. Y. S. 2d 633, aff'd, 301 N. Y. 622, 93 N. E. 915 (1948).
In McMaster & Co. v. McEwen & Co., [19211 Session Cases (H. L.) 24; 58 Scot.
L. R. 70, after the making of a contract for the sale of jute f. o. b. Dundee, a valid
order was issued by the Army Council prohibiting the export of jute except on permit,
held, that the purchaser's failure to obtain a permit did not produce a frustration of
contract; his right to export the goods derived from his ownership of the goods not
from the contract. There would be no frustration unless it was shown that continued
liberty to export was an implied term of the contract. In In re Arbitration between
Anglo-Russian Merchant Traders and John Batt & Co., [1917] 2 K. B. 679, it was
held that if a Government prohibition takes the form of making some act illegal unless a license to do it is obtained, it is the duty of the party whose act is thus made
illegal without a license to bestir himself and apply for a license promptly; if he fails
to do so, he cannot plead that the contract has been frustrated. See, also, J. W. Taylor
& Co. v. Landover & Co., [19401 4 All E. R. 335.
In Socit6 Cooplrative Suisse des Cr~ales, etc. v. LaPlate Cereal Co. S. A., 80
Lloyd's List L. R. 530, at 543 (1947), the contract contained a cancellation clause if
export should be prohibited and the seller's government created a monopoly in the
goods. The contract was held frustrated by the decree of the seller's government, that
new conditions had fundamentally altered the situation and export of the corn was
by law removed from the scope of the private obligation, and the de facto prohibition of export overthrew the contract. See, also, Reilly v. The King, [1934] A. C.
176; Partabmull Rameshwar v. K. C. Sethia, [19511 2 All E. R. 352; Anglo-Russian
Merchant Traders, Ltd. v. Batt. & Co., [19171 2 K. B. 678; Baldwin & Co. v. Turner
& Co., [19201 36 T. L. R. 769. In Smith, C. & B. v. Becker, G. & Co.,. [19161 2 Ch.
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D. 86, it was held that a contract, valid prior to embargo, may not be terminated where
the buyer can put goods into a warehouse in the country embargoing them.
An interesting problem arises in connection with the element of time as affecting
the defense of frustration. In Amtorg, supra, there was no express provision in the contract making acceptance of delivery conditional on issuance to it by the United States
Government of an export permit. Would Amtorg have been entitled to wait until the
end of the "cold war," i. e., until the United States trading embargo on shipments to
the U. S. S. R. had ceased and export permits once more issued?
In Straus v. Kazemakos, 100 Conn. 581, 124 A. 234 (1924), noted in 34 YALE L. J.
91 (1924), the parties agreed that performance should be postponed until the lifting
of an embargo, but the buyer was held after eight months, the risk of depreciation
of the subject matter (Russian rubles) being placed on him. Where sellers agree
to supply buyers for export and an embargo supervenes, the contract may not be repudiated by the sellers in a suit for the value of the goods sold to buyers, when it
appears that the embargo was lifted several weeks after its promulgation; sellers must
wait a "reasonable" time before repudiation. Miller & Co. v. Taylor & Co., [1916]
4 K. B. D. 402.
For a discussion of cases where time is the central issue in applying the doctrine
of frustration, see Bateson, Time as an Element of Frustration,THE BusinEss L. REV.
173, 177 (July 1954).
Nor may a buyer in England cancel a contract for sale of goods made subject to
United States export license, where seller, an American company, was unable to get a
license, but before the time of the first delivery under the installment arrangement,
the restriction was removed. The buyer was under a duty to wait a "reasonable" time
to see whether the seller could in fact get a license before repudiating the contract.
The plea that the contract was "frustrated" because the seller could not immediately
get his license was rejected. The goods sold were 600 lbs. of American saccharin. MR.
JusncF AvoRy, at page 769, in stating this fact, observed: ". . . One would have
thought that was enough to sweeten the whole world... ." Baldwin & Co. v. Turner &
Co., [1920] K. B. D. 36 T. L. R. 769.
Where sellers are obligated to obtain export licenses, and fail, their defense of
frustration may likewise be rejected.
Despite a clause cancelling any unfulfilled part of the contract if export is prohibited, it was held that the seller is liable in damages to the buyer where the contract, made Sept. 20, 1951, called for shipment from an Italian port during October
and November, 1951, and on October 20, 1951 (effective November 1, 1951), an Italian
regulation called for export licenses. At the date of regulation, none of the goods had
been exported. Seller failed to get a license and the court found that had the prohibition of export been instantaneous on October 20, the defense of frustration would have
been effective. But since the seller had ten days (October 20 to November 1) within
which to exercise diligence in shipping and had not done so, it could not rely on the
cancellation clause and was not excused from performing. Smith & Co., Ltd. v. Lindsay, Ltd., [1953) 2 All E. R. 1064.
In Beves & Co. v. Farkas, 1 Lloyd's List L. R. 103 (Q. B. D. 1953), an English
buyer purchased Austrian timber for delivery January to March 1951, from an Austrian
seller, subject to an Austrian "compensation license" (enabling the Austrian exporter
to sell at a "concessionary" price). These licenses were discontinued in January, 1951
and the seller informed the buyer of his inability to deliver, that delivery was made
illegal and therefore it was impossible to perform the contract which seller claimed
was frustrated. It developed that the seller could have, but did not, apply for an
ordinary export license which would have permitted him to export the goods at a
higher price. Taylor & Co. v. Landover & Co., [1940] 68 Lloyd's List L. R. 28. Further, that he had available outside Austria, other timber which would have been a good
delivery under the contract; that instead of allocating such timber to the buyers, the
seller sold it to others at the then current higher prices. The Court rejected the defense of "frustration" and ruled that the withdrawal of "compensation" licenses by
the Austrian government did amount to prohibition of export; that non-delivery was
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Inability of a buyer, under an international sales agreement for
delivery within the United States, to obtain an export license because
of a subsequent government embargo against his country, imposed
after part performance of the contract, undoubtedly frustrates the
buyer's "ultimate" purpose. Amtorg's "ultimate" purpose was export
to the U. S. S. R. But as far as it concerned the seller's liability,
Amtorg's "contractual" purpose was to buy and accept delivery in the
United States. In the absence of an express provision in the contract
that liability was conditional upon obtaining an export license, there
was no basis for Amtorg to assert "frustration of the purpose of the
contract" to justify its claim of discharge. The "ultimate" purpose
was frustrated, but not the "contractual" purpose. There was neither
"impossibility of performance" nor "frustration of purpose of contract." The seller had delivered in part, prior to the government embargo, and was prepared to continue delivery in the United States.
If the embargo had prohibited delivery by the seller to the buyer
within the United States (thus nullifying the "contractual" purpose
of Amtorg) then its claim of discharge by frustration, produced by a
supervening unforeseeable event, might conceivably have been held
valid.
Such supervening events, when caused without fault of either
party, frequently cause frustration of "contractual" purposes. Indeed,
both may suffer losses or sacrifice anticipated profits. Who then must
bear the loss? If a division of loss must be made, in what proportion?
not due to force inajeure as seller could have obtained timber and delivered it to the
buyers. The seller was held in breach of his contract: Discontinuance by the Austrian
government of "compensation" licenses did not render performance impossible, but
merely involved the seller in a loss on the deal, due to the rise in the market price
of timber between the date when the contract was made and the date when it had
to be performed. Said MR. JusTic PicHER, at page 113-114: ". . . It would be a
strange thing if a seller could insist on the contract if the price fell, and could
escape his own obligations if it rose. It would do away with the whole point of forward contracts altogether. . . ." Further, that a seller can invoke frustration
only where the parties clearly contemplated specific, ascertained goods in the
country of origin as the goods to he exported. Where the timber, as here, was unascertained in Austria, and available outside Austria, the defense of frustration fails.
Blackburn Bobbin Co., Ltd. v. T. W. Allen & Son, Ltd., [1918) 2 K. B. 467.
And where sellers of goods from Brazil, "subject to Brazilian export license,"
were notified by the Bank of Brazil, shortly after the date of the contract, that they
could not obtain a license to ship goods to buyers, except at a higher price than contracted for, which would have compelled the sellers to pay a higher price to their
Brazilian suppliers, there was no "prohibition of export" or embargo justifying repudiation of the contract or excusing performance. Brauer & Co., Ltd. v. James Clark,
Ltd., [1952] 2 Lloyd's List L. R. 147.
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What happens to part payments or payments on account of future deliveries?
Today in England, three centuries after the foundation case of
Paradine v. Jane,' the doctrine of frustration is more than ever the
subject of heated controversy which rages over its theoretical and substantive basis. However, the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts)
Act, 1943, 7 is not affected by this cleavage in English juristic thought. 8
6 Paradine v. Jane, 82 Eng. Rep. 897 [1674).
Law Reform Act, 6 & 7 Geo. VI, c. 40 (1943).
8 Gow, Some Observations on Frustration, 3 INT'L & ComP. L. Q. 291-318,
Pt. 11 (1954), attacks the prevaling tendency in England expressed by the House of
Lords, in British Movietone Nevs, Ltd. v. London and District Cinemas, Ltd., [1952)
A. C. 166, to cling to the traditional theory of the "implied term" of the contract
when applying the doctrine of frustration, to persist in claiming that Courts
"have no absolving or qualifying power, cannot make contracts for the parties," and
can merely "interpret" a contract when there is disagreement as to its effect.
DNNINcG, L. J., in the Court of Appeals, [19511 1 K. B. 190, in the Movietone case (which involved the effect of British ivar-time orders restricting the
consumption of raw film stock upon a contract between an exhibitor and a supplier
of news films) had bluntly rejected the traditional theory of the "implied term" and
in his exposition of the basis of the frustration doctrine, followed Lord Wright's position that "the Court really exercises a qualifying power-a power to qualify the absolute or literal or wide terms of the contract-in order to do what is just and reasonable in the new situation"; that "the Court in the absence of express intention of the
parties determines what is just." LoRD WRIGHT, LEGAL EssAYs AND ADDRESSES, 258
(Cambridge 1939). In Constantine (Joseph) Steamship Line, Ltd. v. Imperial Smelting Corp. Ltd. [1942) A. C. 154; Denny Mott v. Dickson, [1945) A. C. 265; Cricklewood Property and Investment Trust, Ltd. v. Leightons Investment Trust, Ltd., [1945]
A. C. 221, Lord Wright had "exposed the real basis of frustration as having nothing
to do with implied condition, although this is the most frequent explanation given by
the judges . . . frustration is a question of law for the judge upon the facts as found."
Webber, Frustration of Contract, CURRENT LEG. PROB. 283 (1951), written, Gow points
out, apparently before the House of Lords decision.
Gow concludes, after tracing the survival of the "implied term" approach to the
persistence in British judicial thought-processes, of the obsolete "freedom of contract"
notion, that ". . . the theory of the 'implied term' is not adequate to the tasks which
the ever-expanding problems of supervening impossibility thrust upon it . . ."; that
"... the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act of 1943 resulted from a break-down
of the theory of the implied term"; that "the Act relies for its administration on
a very extensive third-party discretion, whether judicial or an arbitrator" and that the
theontheory of the implied term" (p. 315-316).
indeed
Act For
an "repudiates
earlier attack
the House of Lord's decision in the Movietone case, see,
Grunfeld, Traditionalism Ascendant, 15 MoD. L. REV. 85-7 (Jan. 1952).
McNair, op. cit. supra note 2 at 143, lists five theories prevalent in England
relating to frustration:
(a) the "implied term or classic approach;
(b) disappearance of the basis of the contract--"non haec in joedera venit."
(c) Lord Wright's theory viz:-'That the parties not having dealt with the matter,
the Courts must determine what is just, must find a reasonable solution for them, a
theory which we suggest involves the importation of another implied term."
(Note: This might be described as the theory of the "implied delegation by the
parties to the judge to exercise his discretion"--the parties, by failing to provide for
the consequences of an unforeseen contingency, must be presumed to have given
the Court power to devise the just remedy under the circumstances. Lord Wright
7
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The function of that statute9 is "adjectival rather than substantive.
would strenuously deny that his approach, as described by McNair, merely substituted
one "implied term" for another! The Court, says Lord Wright, imposes its own just
and reasonable solution, it decides what is the true position of the parties, and its decision is as Lord Sumner said in Hirli Mulji v. Cheong Yue S. S. Co., Ltd., [1926]
A. C. 497, at 510, "irrespective of the individuals concerned, their temperaments and
failings, their interest and circumstances.. . ." WRio3r, LEGAL ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES,
supra, at 258; and Denny Mott v. Dickson, supra, at 274-6).
(d) The theory of common mistake.
(e) The theory of supervening impossibility.
The "implied term" approach has evidently also been accepted by the Scandinavian legal systems. Zepos, Frustration of Contract in the Comparative Law and in
the New Greek Civil Code of 1946, Art. 388, 11 MoD. L. REV. 36-46 (1948).
Corbin is definitely ranged on the "anti-implied term" side, and severely criticizes the reasoning of Viscount Simon in the British Movietone case, at 186, that in
frustration cases, ". . . the question is really at bottom a question of construction."
In 6 CoRBin, CoNmRtcrs, 23, 27, §§ 1331, 1353 (Supp., St. Paul 1954), it is stated:
"the noble Lord fails in his attempt to show that the whole doctrine of frustration
is solely a matter of interpretation ....
The proof, however, depends not upon 'words',
but upon a clear analysis of the facts of the decided cases. The instant case before the
House of Lords was not a case of 'impossibility' in any sense; nor does it appear that
anyone's purposes were 'frustrated.' It is not a good case on which to base a full
analysis of the subject."
9 McNair, The Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act, 1943, 60 L. Q. REv.
160-174 (1944). At page 165, McNair states: ". . . At the outset let us note that the
statute does not give the Court carte blanche to make whatever adjustment seems to
be just and equitable, that is, to act ex aequo et bono; it states certain principles and
imposes certain limits." Chandler v. Webster, [1904] 1 K. B. 493, one of the two
principal "coronation cases," the other being Krell v. Henry, [1903] 2 K. B. 740
(C. A.), which previously determined the contrary, held that the hirer of space from
which to view the coronation procession was required to pay the price despite the
postponement of the procession following the King's illness. The House of Lords, in
1942, overruled Chandler v. Webster by their decision in Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v.
Fairbairn, etc., [1943] A. C. 32, where a buyer, party to a frustrated contract, Was
allowed to recover from his seller, a pre-payment on the ground of failure of con-sideration. McNAIm, supra, p. 161, 162, further states: ". . . the justness of the effect
of the [Fibrosa] decision was universally admitted, though there were some who questioned the wisdom of overruling a decision of the Court of Appeals which had formed
part of our law for more than 40 years, and would have preferred the method of legislation. It was at once recognized that legislation had become necessary in order to
permit a wider adjustment of the rights and liabilities of all the parties to a frustrated
contract. . . . The Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act, 1943, was the result."
The Act relates only to cases under English contracts which have become "impossible
of performance" or been otherwise frustrated and the parties thereto have for that
reason been discharged from the further performance of the contract. Generally, it
permits (a) recovery of money paid, even though at the date of frustration, there has
been no total failure of consideration; (b) it allows a party who has done something
in performance of the contract prior to the frustrating event to claim compensation
for any benefit conferred on the other. Certain contracts (charter-parties, insurance,
sale of specific goods that have perished) are excluded from the Act. CHEaHIRE AND
Fi'ooT, LAw oF CoNTRAcT, 430-432 (2d ed., London 1949). P. B. Mignault, writing
in January, 1943, in 21 CAw. B. REv. 32, on The Frustration of Contracts, A Study
in Comparative Law, commented on the Fibrosa case: "And the interest of the decision
of the House of Lords is enhanced in that it has arrived at a solution which harmonizes with fundamental principles of jurisprudence laid down centuries ago in the
Roman forum. . . ." See, also, Falconbridge, Frustrated Contracts: The Need for Law
Reform, 23 CAN. B. REv. 43-60 (1945).
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It does not define the nature or the scope of frustration but regulates
its consequences once it has happened. . .Though the Act does not
define frustration, there is no reason why the law should not deal
in the same manner with the consequences of the discharge of all
three types of frustration with which it deals, viz: (a) by supervening
impossibility (b) by change in vital circumstances (as in the "Coronation" cases) (c) by supervening illegality." Reversing the old rule that
the "loss falls where it lies," and embodying the principle of restitution,
Sec. 1, subsec. 2 of the Act grants a party the right to "recover all
sums paid before the discharge of the contract and for the use of the
other party, less any sums for expenses such as the Court determines are
properly allowable to him." Subsection 3 embodies the principle of unjust enrichment, and permits a party to recover a "valuable benefit" received from him by the other party whether or not made before performance of the contract.
In the United States, as Professor Anderson has pointed out, the
doctrine of frustration has become a juristic orphan. While not flatly
rejected it has received only occasional tangential mention by the
courts, or else has been studiously ignored in concrete application.1 0
It is curious that over 70 years before the Frustrated Contract Act, § 56, LX Indian Contract Act (1872) had already provided: "An agreement to do an act impossible in itself is void. A contract to do an act which after the contract is made becomes impossible, or by reason of some event which the promisor could not prevent,
unlawful, becomes void when the act becomes impossible or unlawful. Where one person has promised to do something which he knew or with reasonable diligence might
have known and which the promisee did not know to be impossible or unlawful,
such promisor must make compensation to such promisee for any loss which such
promisee sustains through the non-performance of the promise." Khaitan, An Examination of the Indian Law Relating to Impossibility of Performance of Contracts,
6 INDLAN L. REV. 145-188 (1952). The origin of this section is believed to be English
and not attributable to indigenous Mohammedan or Hindu laws according to Khaitan.
Evidently the section was inserted in the last-minute revision of the draft as
indicated by the speech of Sir James Fitz James Stephens, when introducing

the bill in council on April 9, 1872. See,

POLLOCK AND MULLA'S, COMMENTARY

ON THE

Iswa n CONTRACT ACT, 306 (7th ed. by Sir M. Gwyer, London 1944); RANXW, BACKGROUND TO INDIA_ LAW, c. VII, § 1 (Cambridge [Eng.], 1946).

In Kesarichaid v. Gov. General'in Council, [1949] 1 L. R. 718 (Nagpur Court),
the Court stated that "the doctrine of frustration had been traced to a treatise on 'The
law of Nature and Nations,' and that it is a principle so inherently just and reasonable as inevitably to find a place in any civilized system of law." See, also, Ram
Kisham, Effect of Frustration, 1 VyAVAirAR NmNAYA 92 (March 1952) (Law Union,
Faculty of Law, University of Delhi, India).
30 In Petaccia v. Gallian, 16 N. J. Sup. 427, 84 A. 2d 748 (1951) (a case in which
the frustration concept might have been applied), the issue revolved around a purchase of the never-produced "Tucker" car, conditioned on the prior purchase of accessories. The Court reversed a judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of the price
of the accessories (which he had in reality paid as a "deposit" on account of the price
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In 1922, Conlen hopefully described the doctrine in the United
States as "still a growing one and perhaps not yet fully recognized in
the courts of first instance in this country."11
In 1932, Rothschild concluded: ". . Quite true, is it therefore
that the law of implied condition or of frustration is but in a process
of transition. At this moment, for commercial transactions contemplating goods to be created in the future, it is well-nigh a phrase rather
than a fact.... .""

Anderson, in 1954,11 after making an exhaustive review of the
of the car). Indicative of the sidewise and timid approach of some American courts
to the notion of frustration is the Court's concluding comment at page 750. Though
the plaintiff had not asserted restitution on the basis of frustration nor mentioned the
latter, but claimed fraud as the ground for demanding return of his deposit, the Court
stated: "We repeat that there is no evidence of fraud on the part of the defendants.
We have no reason to suppose that they foresaw that the Tucker would never actually
be brought into production and put on the market. It may he that the plaintiff will
be able to amend his complaint so as to show a cause of action, consonant with the

facts. Both parties probably entered into the contract for accessories in implicit

confidence that Tuckers wquld soon be available. If they had not so believed, they
would not have made the contract. Counsel for plaintiff may well consider whether
the doctrine of frustration is followed in New Jersey and whether it gives his client a
cause of action. See, RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTs, §§ 288, 468 (1932); WIL=ISTON, CONTACTS, § 1954 (New York 1936-1938; and Periee v. Jeffcott, 89 N. J. L. 34, 97 A.
789 (Sup. Ct. 1916), judgment reversed.
But Dawson, viewing the confusion and lack of unifying principle in the mass

of American restitution cases, observes that nevertheless, the courts have ".. .responded remarkably well. Specific solutions in restitution cases are still on the whole in-

genious and sensible. It is only when one tries to string them together, that one becomes confused. . . ." DiwsoN, UNJUST ENRIcHmENT 112 (Boston 1951).
Sec. 468 of the RESTATEmENT OF CONTRACTs 884 (1932), Rights of Restitution,
reads:
"(1) Except where a contract clearly provides otherwise, a party thereto who has
rendered part performance for which there is no defined return performance fixed by
the contract, and who is discharged from the duty of further performance by impossi-

bility of rendering it, can get judgment for the value of the part performance ren-

dered, unless it can be and is returned to him in specie within a reasonable time.
"(2) Except where a contract dearly provides otherwise, a party thereto who has
rendered performance for which the other party is excused by impossibility from rendering the agreed exchange, can get judgment for the value of what he has rendered,
less the value of what he has received, unless what he has rendered can be and is
returned to him in specie within a reasonable time.
"(3) The value of performance within the meaning of Subsections (1, 2) is the

benefit derived from the performance in advancing the object of the contract, not

exceeding, however, a ratable portion of the contract price."
It should be noted that the RESTATEMENT OF RESnrunoN (1937) "deals with situations in which one person is accountable to another on the ground that otherwise he
would unjustly benefit or -the other would unjustly suffer loss. . . . The subject indudes the rules usually classified under the heading of quasi-contracts . . ." (General
Scope Note, p. 1).
11 Conlen, The Doctrine of Frustrationas Applied to Contracts, 70 U. PA. L. REV.

87-95 (1922).

12 Rothschild, note 2 supra, at 356.
13 Anderson, Frustration of Contract--A Rejected Doctrine, 3 DE PAuL L. REV.
1-22 (1953). ". . . At the time when the Restatement was being written, the case
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American cases stated that: ". . . acceptance still has not occurred:
during the entire 50 years of its history it is believed no American
court of last resort has based its decision, in litigation involving a
contract, expressly on the doctrine of frustration or on Sec. 288 of the
Restatement of Contracts. . . ." Like many other concepts, not fully
understood, yet emanating some indefinable merit (perhaps because
of its British-maritime origins?), which somehow it would be unworthy
of the courts wholly to ignore, "frustration" wanders in the outer doctrinal darkness of the American Common law of contracts, in a sort of
juridical purgatory, neither wholly dead, nor yet fully alive.
It is submitted that the important question is not, what have been
the vicissitudes of "frustration-in-the-abstract",but (to adopt an excellent phrase of Professor Anderson's), how have courts molded
remedies when confronted with the great variety of "frustration-infact" situations, 4 where the "shattering of hopes and plans by subsequent events" (especially unforeseen government intervention) call
for the liquidation on a just and equitable basis of mutual obligations
whose performances have been halted in mid-stream? It is difficult to
share Professor Anderson's gloom over the failure of the "frustration"
concept to "catch on" with American courts. Is it cause for dismay
if, by and large, satisfactory results in the "frustration-type" cases are
reached without resort to the doctrine as such (as seems to be indicated by his survey)? Do concepts of contract law, especially in the
law did not justify the recognition of the doctrine as a part of the American common
law, but those responsible for the Restatement nevertheless included it as Sec. 288 .. "
In his zeal for generalization, the writer evidently had forgotten his citation on
page 11, of Osius v. Barton, 109 Fla. 556, 147 So. 862 (1933) as the ". . . only case
in history in which an American court of last resort has rested its decision expressly
on the doctrine of frustration or Section 288"--refusal of the Court to enjoin a commercial use of land deeded originally with a restriction to single family dwellings, where
the character of the neighborhood had changed. Two random usages of the word
"frustrate" are distinguished by Anderson, apart from the doctrine of frustration of
contract: (a) Contracts are sometimes spoken of as "frustrated" when what actually has occurred is that performance has become impossible-two mutually opposed concepts; where the defense of frustration is interposed, performance is possible, but the exchange has become undesirable, as in the "Coronation cases." (b) "Frustration of voyage" in admiralty cases which are too remote from the common law doctrine of frustration to be considered as properly a part of its study.
As to England, however, McNAn, LEGAL E'c~rs oF WAR, 135 (Cambridge 1948)
states that the common law as to supervening difficulty and impossibility (Paradine v.
Jane and its descendants) as one great source of the doctrine of frustration, and the
commercial doctrine of the "frustration of wartime adventure" merged and coalesced
during World War I, when Lord Loreburn in Tamplin S. S. Co. v. Anglo-Mexican
Petroleum Products Co., [1916] 2 A. C. 404, asserted that the principles in the
latter cases are the same as in others.
14 Anderson, supra, at 2.
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severely practical area of performance and discharge call for sanctification per se? It may well be the vague contours of "frustration"
(unaided in the United States by a "Frustrated Contracts" statute,
or unclarified by Sec. 288 of the Contracts Restatement) which have
persuaded American courts to look elsewhere for guidance.
II.

CIVIL LAW REMEDIES IN FRUSTRATED INTERNATIONAL SALES AGREEMENTS

is, of course, wide variance among remedies afforded by
various legal systems in cases of sales contracts aborted by supervening illegality. All proceed from a common substantive basis-recognition of the inequity which would result unless restitution or discharge
were accorded to a buyer innocent of true default, prohibited from
performing or unable to obtain performance because of some legal
inhibition upon him or the seller. "So there is now a general uniformity in basic principle between civil law and common law on frustration
of contract. The fundamental approach of each has become similar to
that of classical Roman law."' 5 From the comparative law point of
THERE

15 For the Roman law origins of unjust enrichment see: Baxter, Unjust Enrichment in the Canadian Common Law and in Quebec Law: Frustration of Contract,
32 CAN. B. REV. 855-857 (1954). See, also, BucxLAND AND McNAm, RoMAN LAW AND
COmOm"
LAW, 240 (2d ed. by Lawson, Cambridge [Eng.] 1952). At page 873, Baxter
states: ". . But with the two systems side by side in Canada (i. e., common law provinces and code in Quebec) and a single supreme court, there seems to be a special opportunity to obtain the best from each in the development of a branch of law related to
unjust enrichment. .
. It would be no sign of weakness for one system to imitate
or borrow from the other. . . ." This calls to mind a fascinating talk by Judge
Jerome Frank of the United States Court of Appeals, before a joint meeting of
the American Foreign Law Association and the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York, at the House of the Association, on February 17, 1955, on the influence
of the civil law upon the common law, in which he concluded that while juridical
symbiosis of the various legal systems may be instructive and useful to both, juridical
"miscegenation" or absorption of civil law concepts is undesirable because of their
"indigestibility" in common-law jurisdictions. This would not seem to have been the
case in Puerto Rico, Philippines, Louisiana, or Canada. In these areas, both systems
have for considerable periods influenced and cross-fertilized each other without producing "discomfort" or "cross-sterilization." It seems a truism that the major western
legal systems of today are eclectic products. A prime objective of comparative law
should be not merely a sterile academic pursuit and depiction of parallelisrns or diversities among the systems, but a conscious effort, in the interest of unification to urge
adoption or adaptation of whatever desirable non-indigenous concepts or procedures
have been under study, keeping in mind the limitations of the legal and social milieu
proposed as-host. See, GUTrimDGE, COmPARATIE LAW, 9 (2d ed., Brooklyn 1949).
On the dynamic process of amalgamation of civil law and common-law elements in
the Philippines and Louisiana, see, SCHLESINGER, COmPARATIVE LAW CASES AND MATERIAz.s, 152-168 (Cambridge 1950). See, also, Ramos, Interaction of Civil Law and AngloAmerican Law in the Legal Method in Puerto Rico, 23 TuLANE L. REv. 1 (1948).
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view, we find divergences only as to the extent of judicial discretion
in revision of the contract and fixing an appropriate remedy. These
range from the common law doctrine that the judge cannot "remake"
a contract or "absolve" the parties (although determining damages
for any breach), to the sweeping judicial revisionary power granted
by Article 388 of the Greek Civil Code to a judge in cases of supervening- impossibility, not only to decree partial or total discharge of
the contract, but also to make alterations and even a total change in
the conditions under which the obligations arising from a contract are
to be carried out.
In those "prohibition of export cases" where performance never
occurred, the problem of remedy remains relatively simple (whether
or not the Court recognizes frustration resulting from supervening
illegality as a defense), and the decisions in the United States and
England are fairly uniform. I have, however, selected for comparative
review the handling of those other situations where "complications"
have set in, and where the courts must resort to restitutionary remedies to "unwind the contract." What are the consequences, where
part payments had been made by the purchaser, where the seller has
incurred manufacturing and shipping expense, etc.? When parties
have received uncompensated benefits at each other's expense, we
reach the area where the doctrines of unjust enrichment and restitution
come into play.16
The evolution of the doctrine of frustration of contract due to
supervening impossibility is marked by a steady attempt of courts in
common law as well as code jurisdictions to reconcile the principles of
pacta sunt servanda with clausula rebus sic stantibus. The catastrophic
impact of the First World War on domestic commercial and international transactions exposed the injustice of a strict application of
pacta sunt servanda. In the following review, the attempt is made to
bring together for comparative purposes, the present positions of com16 Baxter, id. at 873, states: ". . . Where, without fault of the parties, it becomes impossible to complete a contract which has been partly performed, this
would seem an appropriate situation in which to apply a principle of unjust enrichment to prevent a party gaining an unfair advantage by reason of the unexpected obstacle to completion. . . . The common law jurisdictions have arrived more or less
at this position (with the help of statutory changes) but the process has been
slow. . . ." For a comparative treatment of the doctrine of unjust enrichment, see:
Ernst von Caemmerer, Bereicherung und underlaubte Handlung, 1 FESTSCHRIFr FR
ERNST RABEL, 333-401 (Germany 1954), and Dawson, Unjust Enrichment, note 10
supra, at 112, et seq. on the chaotic state of the American law of restitution.
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mon law and code systems on the remedial facets of cases centered
7
around supervening illegality.'
A.

SCOTS LAW

IN 1923 the harsh rule of Chandler v. Webster (one of the "Coronation cases") was expressly repudiated in Cantiore San Rocco v. Clyde
Shipbuilding Co.' The House of Lords held, in determining the
"Coronation cases" that a first installment payment on a frustrated
contract could not be recovered. This holding was not binding in
Scotland.
Delivery of marine engines purchased by an Austrian company
from a Scottish company (payment in five installments of which the
17 Zepos, in Frustration of Contract in Comparative Law and in the New Greek
Civil Code of 1946, (Art. 388), 11 MOD. L. REV. 36-46 (1948), summarizing at p. 45,
claims that the general frustration clause contained in Art. 388 "gives a solution to all
the problems arising from the frustration of a contract which have the subject of
analysis and criticism both in the English and continental legal systems. The framers
of this article evidently attempted to formulate a synthesis of the theory of "l'imprvision" and "Unzutnutbarkeit der Leistung," so as to simplify the problem of nonperformance and impossibility of performance, by abolishing the German distinctions between "original," "supervening," "objective," and "subjective" impossibility, and making
any culpable violation of a promisor's action able for damages, thus abandoning the "dangerous rule" of "impossibiium nulla est obligatio." The gist of Art. 388 (states Zepos,
page 43), is that in cases of a supervening change in the circumstances under which a contract was made where these circumstances constitute the basis and foundation of the contract, the court may decree the entire or partial discharge of the contract, if in its opinion
the performance of the contract should not be claimed. Where there has been a discharge
of all obligations, parties are required to return all they have received, according to
the provisions relating to unjustifiable enrichment. The key, however, to the effectiveness of this article is the judge, who according to Zepos (page 44), "is not an automaton in the application of a concrete legal system, but also collaborates with the
legislator and contributes to his task. He is a real interpreter of the system of law who
has not only to fill the 'gaps' in

the given legal system, but

who is

also able

to

make alterations and even a total change in the conditions under which the obligations arising from a contract are to be carried out." This conception is close to the
Swiss principle in Art. 1 (2) (3) of the Swiss Civil Code, granting power to the judge
in default of positive rules or customs to decide "as if he had himself to act as legis-

lator."
A proposed article (No. 1150) for the 1928 Hungarian Civil Code; Articles 146769 of the recent Italian Civil Code; Art. 269 of the Polish Civil Code and Art. 147
of the Egyptian Civil Code invite comparison with Art. 388 of the Greek Civil Code,
in that they approximate its provisions on judicial discretion and discharge of contracts under "excessively onerous or unforeseeable conditions. See the companion articles by Meijers and da Fonseca, La force obligatoire des Contrats et ses Modifications
dans les Droits Modernes, 1951 INT'L INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAw,
99-129. Professor Meijers leans toward restraint of judicial discretion and contends
that if parties are to be permitted too many excuses for discharge, ". . . s'ils peuvent
demander trop facilement au juge la resiliation a la modification d'un contrat, ce
sera la fin de la confiance riciproque, base de tous -les rapports juridiques entre les
hotnines."

18 Cantiere San Rocco v. Clyde Shipbuilding, [1924] A. C. 226.

NEW YORK LAW FORUM

[VoL. 3

first was paid) was frustrated by the outbreak of World War I.
The seller did nothing except make plans and order material.
Restitution of the first payment was ordered on the ground of failure of consideration, subject to any counter-claim established for
work done under the contract. The Earl of Birkenhead stated that,
".. . in order to formulate the rule applicable to this case, it is
necessary to consider first the Roman law as a source of Scottish
law, and secondly the Scottish authorities which show how far the
Roman law applicable to this topic has been received and applied in
the law of Scotland. . . .," Lord Shaw stated that the case would be
a "typical case of restitution under the Roman law and one for the
application of the maxim, 'causa data causa non secuta' . . .,"I and
further, while the unjust rule of Chandler v. Webster that nothing can
be done to adjust the rights of the parties where an advance payment
has been made and the performance, which was the consideration for
the payment, became impossible, may be the law of England and applies the maxim of "potior est conditio possidentis"-a maxim "which
works well enough among tricksters, gamblers and thieves" . . . "this
is not part or ever was any part of the law of Scotland."'"
In the Scottish doctrine of frustration, the concepts of restitution
and of the courts' ample powers to create remedies for equitable readjustment of the parties' relationships (rather than the question of
whether or not the parties' obligations have been dissolved) receive the
central emphasis. Scots law eschews philosophic speculation on the
problems of "implied term". Scottish courts have all the requisite powers (even without statutory authority such as for example granted
to them under the War Damage to Land [Scotland] Act, 1939)22 to
mold the necessary remedies. This act aided to work justice between
parties whose contract had been aborted by supervening illegality
after part payments or part performance.
Restitution as the substitute obligation for the original but extinguished contract obligation, has been the basis of the Scottish doctrine of frustration since the 17th century.
Recently,23 however, it has been pointed out that if certain dicta
19 Id. at 234.
Id. at 259.
21 Id. at 260.
20

War Damage to Land Act, 2 & 3 Geo. VI, c. 80 (1939).
The traditional Scottish position is forcefully stated by Lord Cooper in Doctrine of Frustrationin Scots Law, 28 J. Comp. LEa. & INT'L L. (3d Ser.) Parts 3 and
22
23
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in the now famous "British Movietone" case" were followed closely
in Scotland, the traditional approach--"equitable adjustment by judicial decree when one party to a transaction has been enriched unintentionally at the expense of the other"--would be overridden. "It
is possible that English influence and the suggestion that questions of
frustration are of 'general jurisprudence,' may supersede the older tra25
dition of Scottish law.")
B.

FRENCH LAW:

1. "FoRcE MAJEURE" AND

LIMPP&IVISION"

THE defense of impossibility of performance is treated under the
doctrine of "force majeure".2 6 Impossibility must be absolute (by
4, 1-5 (1946). Comment on the more recent position is made by Professor T. B. Smith,
in English Influence on the Law of Scotland, 3 Am. J. Comep. L., 522-542 at 540.
24 [1952] A. C. 166.
25 It is interesting that despite the civilian derivation of the law of South Africa,
the early cases there involving impossibility of performance relied on the English
doctrine of frustration, and it was not until 1919 in Peters, Hamman & Co. v. Kokstad Municipality, [1919] A. D. 427 that the civil law doctrine of impossibility was
applied.
In Bayley v. Harwood, (3) S. A. 239 (T) (1953). See ANNUAL SURVEY OF SOUTH
AnuscA LAW 88 (1953), the defense of frustration was rejected by the Court which
held that that doctrine did not form part of South African law. Proof of absolute,not partial impossibility, is necessary in order to sustain a defense that a contract has
been discharged by impossibility of performance, Weinberg v. Weinberg Bros. (Pty)
Lt'd, (3) S. A. 266 (C) (1951). See AN~uNA SURVEY OF SouTH AnicAC
LAW, 83
(1951). For an historical review, see Lee, Frustration of Contract in the Union of
South Africa, 28 J. Comrp. LEo. & INT'L L. S (Pts. 3 & 4) (3d Series 1946).
26 Code Civil, Arts. 1147, 1148. Under the French Doctrine of "force majeure"
as the basis for pleading excuse for performance, the general rule is that the discharge
on that ground will not be recognized unless the occasion thereof made performance
absolutely impossible, and the event must have occurred independently of the party
pleading for discharge, must not have been under his later control or have been of
such a character that its occurrence could not have been reasonably foreseen at the
time the agreement ivas entered into. (Code Civil 1148). "Fait du Prince" is the
French generic expression designating "among other acts" governmental intervention
(for example "menace de r~quisition") prohibiting performance of a contract of sale for
export, "L'autoritM publique peut requisitioner ou bloquer des produits qui devait
Rtre livris ou exportis . . . interdire certains commerces ou certains lieux de destination. . . ." Dalloz, Force Majeure, 2 NOUVEAU REPERToIE DE DROrT 595 (Paris 1948).
Thus a seller who cannot make delivery of goods on a contract for export because
of governmental suppression of export licenses after the contract was made is exonerated of liability on the ground, that this "fait du commerce" constitutes "force
majeure" (1 REvuE TR
uEsTRIELLE
DE DR. Comm-r. 128 (1948)-(Req. 27 January
1947, IV J. C. P. 55)). French courts during the First World War began to embody
within the concept "force majeure," cases where no absolute impossibility occurred, but
merely facts constituting extreme hardship and under conditions which the original
basis of the contract was destroyed and the parties must have intended it to be dissolved in view' of their contracting with reference to a specific state of .facts wlich
was vitally changed by events beyond their control. This position .was. defended by
writers putting forward the theory of "i'imprdvision" or the release of a debtor by reason
of occurrences which could not have been foreseen. J. Denson Smith, Impossibility of
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reason of the later occurrence of an event unforeseeable at the time
of execution) of which there are two categories: (1) "Legal" impossibility-i. e., supervening illegality by reason of a law or decree inhibiting performance (the "prohibition of export" cases in England
and the United States, where frustration is set up as a defense, would
fall into this category). (2) "Physical" impossibility; destruction of
goods, Act of God, seizure in war, etc. In all other cases, where the
"fault" of the promisor is in issue (the Roman law principle "culpa"
being the basis for determining in cases of non-performance, whether
the promisor was liable or not for damages), sanctity of contract,
pacta sunt servanda, has been strictly adhered to.
The economic chaos during and following World War I
gave rise to the "theorie de l'imprivision 27 to justify extension of the
scope of "force majeure" to include cases where no absolute impossibility existed, but performance would have been far more burdensome
than could have been foreseen at the time the contract was entered
into. The rationale of "imprivision" is based on the importation of
the now discredited international law principle of "clausuld rebus sic
stantibus"25 (the claim that non-performance of a treaty is justifiable
because of material and unexpected change of circumstances) into the
area of private commercial contracts. Since, in French law, a contract
must be interpreted according to the parties' intention, the implied
condition, "rebus sic stantibus" must be read into all contracts as having been agreed to by the parties; 29 and further that Art. 1134 of the
Civil Code requires performance bona fide of all contracts.
Performance as an Excuse in French Law--The Doctrine of Force Majeure, 45 YALE
L. J. 452-467 (1935-1936). See, also, Ch. Blaevoet, Modifications i la thgorie du fait du
prince, 52 RnvuE TRrsmTR=Ltx DE DRIT CIvIL 65 (Paris 1954).
For a comparison between Art. 1148 Code Civil and Art. 1933 (2) of the Louisiana
Civil Code (which releases an obligor from liability for damages when performance
of his obligation is hindered by a "fortuitous" event or "irresistible force") see, Hunley, "Supervening Impossibility as a Discharge of an Obligation," 21 TULANE L. REV.
604-618 (1947).
27 Ren6 David, Frustration of Contract in French Law, 28 J. Corp. LEo & INT'L
L. 11 (3d Series 1946); 29 Id. at 14 (1947).
28 JEssup, A MoDE N LAW oF NATIONS-AN INTRODUCION, 150, 151 (New York
1948). See, also, M. WA5INE, TRAT EL mENTAmRE DE DROIT A~nasrmTxrAT, § 2, 626
(6 ed. b. Sirey, Paris 1951). Sec. 2: "Applications," states:
Cette alternative entre ]a force majeure et l'impr~vision ne se recontre pas
seulement en droit administratif. En droit international public, law th6orie de ]a force
majeure applique6 aux traits devient la thorie de ]a clause rebus sic stantibus et law
th6orie de l'imprvision, cele de law revision des traits. . ....
29 This echoes the current controversy in England over the "Implied term" as
the basis of frustration (see note 8 supra), arising from the British Movietone case.
For the reasoning justifying the need in French law of an "implied term" approach
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"Impr~vision" is thus the closest parallel to the English doctrine
of frustration.
The theory of "l'imprivision"is not accepted by the Cour de Cassation or the civil or commercial courts, due to their insistence on
pacta sunt servanda, and strict interpretation of force Majeure. This
' 0 Contrary
results in the famous cleavage relating to "impr~vision."
to the Court de Cassation, the Conseil d'Etat (not bound by the
Code Civil) and the "Tribunaux Administratix" to accept and have
applied this theory in a number of cases. The French "droit administratif," which is motivated chiefly by the "public interest and welfare," governs between the State and/or a public body and an individual. "Imprgvision," however, is limited to long-term contract situations where, performance has become unduly burdensome under unexpected or unforeseen conditions. A party may then ask for relief
and the agency in question will be required to modify the arrangements or pay an indemnity to enable the individual to profitably continue performance. Strained economic conditions in World War I gave
birth to the well-known "Loi Failliot" in 1918, a statute which permitted revision of the pre-1914 contracts. There has been legislation since,
permitting revision or cancellation of various types of contracts such
as landlord ind tenant, sales of business concerns ("fonds du commerce") and favoring victims of Nazi racial discrimination.
David believes resort to the theory of "l'imprivision" may well
decline 31 in all cases, both in civil and commercial courts, as well as
those governed by the "droit administratif," because of the increasing
French practice of inserting clauses permitting revision under changed
conditions (thus spelling out rebus sic stantibus), instead of leaving it
to implication, as well as the use of arbitration clauses under which
arbitrators are given power to act as "compositeurs amiables." These
may determine disputes not strictly according to French law, but ac("clause accessoire h l'accord principalet ordinairenent tacite et conditionnelle") in order
to give a logical basis to the discharge of obligation in "force majeure" cases, see
Wigney, Responsibiliti Contractuelle et force majeure, 34 Rlvan TRIMESTRILE DE

DROIT Civm 20 (1935). For the thesis that "force inajeure" in the French law of con-

tracts and "absence de faute" are interdependent and correlative concepts, see A. Tunc,

Force majeure et absence de faut en inatire contractuelle, 43 REVUn

TRiMESTRILE DE

DROIT Cevm 235-257 (1945). For a brief survey of the development of the principle
of unjust enrichment in French law and the action for restitution under Arts. 1376
and 1377 of the Code Civil, as applications of that principle, see Amos & WALTox,
INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW,

204-210 (London 1935).

David, note 27 supra at 13.
31 Id. at 14.
30
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cording to their own conception of natural justice, in the light of the
changed conditions in question. Their awards are final and nonappealable.
2. THE LAW OF APRIL 23, 1949
An important statutory extension of judicial discretion in the
area of unforeseen commercial difficulties precipitated by World War
II, was made in the law of 23 April, 1949.32 This law permits French
judges to declare the cancellation, with certain exceptions, of contracts entered into before September 2, 1949 relating to delivery of
goods, manufactured products or commodities, work contracts, etc.
Request for such cancellation must have been made by either one of
the parties prior to-July 1, 1949 or for those outside of France, before
June 1, 1950. Failing a compromise or settlement, a party could demand a cancellation; the judge could pronounce such a cancellation
with or without granting damages, if such party established that due
to war conditions or unusual economic conditions he had to increase
his costs or expenses, or that losses would have been caused him far
beyond what it would have been reasonable to expect or to foresee
at the time the contract was made. Contracts made between September 1, 1939 and the date of liberation were also cancellable in the
same way, if the demanding party proved that at the time for performance the changed economic conditions resulting from the war
had made it impossible for him to perform, without having to incur
such entirely new costs as would have prejudiced him to such a degree
that performance could not take place without completely upsetting
or drastically changing the contract. The law applied retroactively to
pending cases involving contracts not yet performed. Some question
was raised as to the long delay in passing this legislation 3 (almost
32 "Loi No. 49-547 du 22 Avril 1949 permettant la risiliation de certains fnarchds
et contrats" GAZETTE DU PALAs 1949 (1 er sem.) 462. For an elaborate analysis of
the impact of this law on French 'commercial contracts generally, a comparison of the
law with its earlier counterpart, the "Loi Faillot" of 1918 and consequential modifications of the "th~orie de l'imprivision," see Peytel, La tliorie de l'inprdvsion et les
contrats commerciaux" (1 er. sem. 1949), "Doctrine" 56-62 (Paris 1949). See, also,

Toujas,- aLrisiliation de certains marchis et contrats" (Commentaire de la loi du 22
Avril, 1949) Semaine Juridiqite, 1949, "Doctrine", 774 (Pails). A note to the law following its reprint in Recueil Dalloz 1949, 241, states: ". . . Cette lol est jondde sur la
thiorie de l'inprivison. Le principe n'en est pas nouveau. Lorsque la guerre de 19141918, an texte analogue Loit Faillot du Janv. 1918 (D. P. 1918.4.261) avait dI vote;
mais les contrats commerciaux en avait seule le bdndfice." See, also, D -noz, NOUVEAU
REPERTom
DE DRoir 100, "Resiliation des contrats" (Paris 1952).
33 Peytel, note 32 supra at 56.
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five years after the liberation) whereas the "Loi Failliot," prepared in
1916, was passed during the War, in January 1918.
Thus "disruption of the economy" due to war conditions is conceived in French law to be a catastrophe, general collapse justifying
national intervention in the form of a sweeping grant of judicial power,
contrasted with the specific and narrow supervening illegality produced by a governmental prohibition of exports. This power enables
the judge literally to make or unmake contracts, as well as in his
unfettered discretion, to refuse or to grant damages, 34 exercising what
in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence is called "equitable powers." 35
From the point of view of the present French economic order
("6conomie dirig6e") the doctrine of 'Timpr~vision" would seem to
afford the basis, in those cases arising under the "loi administratif,"
for an allocation or a division of losses between the public agency and
its opponent, which resulted from an unforeseen extreme rise in prices
or some major economic convulsion ("Bouleversement de l'6conomie")
occurring during the course of performance; thus the relative economic
position of the parties ("l'equilibre financier du contrat") may be
maintained. While both "l'impr6vision" and the theory of "fait du
prince" tend to the same result (maintenance of the original contractual and economic relationship freely entered into between the parties), it is important to distinguish between the two theories. From
the juridical view, the theory of "fait du prince" envisages a direct,
governmental intervention during performance which disrupts the
contractual relationship. This may have an important bearing on the
judge's determination as to which party assumed -the risk and how
damages should be distributed.3" In either case, basically, the French
34 Id. at 81.
35 Peytel, id. at

61, describes the jurisprudence that grew out of the "loi
Faillot" as representing "avant tout, une loi d'equit6" which merely effectuated the

legislative intention to prevent the ruin of one party and the benefiting and enrichment of the other as a result of nation-wide economic conditions after a war affecting
all persons.
In Belgium a law comparable to the Loi Faillot was enacted on October 11, 1919,
modified July 23, 1924 and another on June 20, 1930, for discharge of long-term leases
executed before December 31, 1923.
386French commentators seem divided on the question as to whether the 1949 law
applies to "contrats administratifs"-see Louis de Soto, La loi du Avril 22, 1949,
est-elle applicable aux contrats administratif? SEmAUN JuRIDiQuE, "Doctrine" 809
(Paris 1949), where it is asserted that procedural provisions of the law prove that it
was written "l'esprit civil" and not "administratiF' thus excluding its application to the
latter category of cases. For a discussion of the impact of the doctrine of "l'imprvision," during a period of "'economie liberale" as compared to the present French
"economie dirigie," see Jean de Soto, Imprjvision et iconomie Dirigle, SKEMA E JuRDIQUE, Doctrine 817 (Paris 1950).
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judge would seem to have the power to choose between cancellation
of the contract or its continuance in effect, subject to such modifica37
tions as may seem to him equitable.
C.

GERMAN LAW

GERMANY perhaps more than any western European nation,
during the period between 1914 and the present, has been subjected
to the economic convulsions of war, currency inflation and revaluation, rendering the certainty and dependability of commercial contract
performance in constant doubt. Impossibility of performance and frustration were ever present risks in industrial and commercial life.
It may not be too wide of the mark to characterize German attempts,
in many areas of the law, to handle the vast problem of frustration
and contract disruption as the frank adoption of administrative or
quasi-administrative techniques, in the form of greatly enlarged powers of the judges to "remake" rather than to dissolve or grant recission
of contracts, and a movement away from the conventional judicial
enforcement of contractual rights.

1. "FORTFALL DER GESCHXFTSGRUNDLAGE"
(LAPSE OF THE BASIS OF CONTRACTS)

Cohen3" has sketched the evolution of the German concept of

impossibility ("unm6glichkeit"):
(a) from its adoption in Sec. 306 of the B. G. B. of the Roman
principle of "Impossibilium non est obligatio" (initial impossibility);
(b) its elaboration39 in Sec. 275, 276, 279, 280, 281, 282, 307,
308, 323 and 32440 of B. G. B.;
37 M. Planiol, et G. Ripert, Tome IV, 6 "TRAiTE" PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIvIL FRANcAis, Sec. III, Par. 538 (Paris 1952). At p. 537, it is noted that certain civil codes
other than the French (viz. Polish Code of Obligations 1934, art. 269; Italian Civil
Code 1942, arts. 1467-1469 and Egyptian Civil Code (1949), art. 147(2)) grant judges
the power to modify or cancel contracts when performance has been disrupted by
drastic economic changes. See also, 2 DE LA MORAUDIERF, COURS fLiMENTAIRE DE DROIT
civn. FRANCAIs, 94 (10th ed., France 1948).
38 Cohen, Frustration of Contract in German Law, 28 J. ComP. LEC. & INT'L L.
15-25, Pts. II, IV, (3d Series, 1946).
39 See the summary in GoTTsc ALK, ImPOSSiBIUTY OF PEaRFORMANCE IN CONTRACT,

128-135 (London 1938), introduced by the comment; "The German law on this sub-

ject is stated incoherently in three different parts of the German Civil Code. Its statement is therefore difficult." Closely related, he points out, (at 132-135) are the rules
as to the passing of the risk in German Contract Law. (§§ 243, 446, 447, 536, 615,
616, 644, 645, 651).
40 E. Wolf has recently criticized as superfluous and misleading and has urged the
elimination of the conceptual differentiations or antinomies set forth in the BGB re-
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(c) the revival by Windscheid in 1852 of "clausularebus sic stantibus" in the form of the notion of "requirement" ("Voraussetzung"),
i. e., an "undeveloped condition" of a contract, contrasted with an express condition (and entitling a party to repudiate the contract or
demand return of any performance made by him if the "requirements"
were not complied with);
(d) the modification of the "clausula" in 1921 by Oertmann
(under the impact of the cases growing out of the currency inflation)
in the form of "the contractual basis" concept ("geschiftsgrundlage"),
i. e., an assumption by one or both parties of the continued existence
from the inception of the contract, of circumstances which form the
basis of the contractual relationship. This led to the use in a variety
of cases of the defense styled "lapse of the basis of contracts" ("Fortfall der Geschiftsgrundlage") entitling each party to rescind the contract ("Riicktritt"), according to the provisions of the Civil Code; 41
(e) the inadequacy of the traditional concept of impossibility in
the light of extraordinary economic changes after World War I, resulting in attempts by German courts to adopt "economic impossibility" (a vague concept, difficult to apply) as the criterion for performance;
(f) the abandonment of "impossibility" and increasing resort to
the famous Sec. 242 of the Civil Code ("Treu und Glauben") 41the requirement of good faith in the performance of contracts-as
the basis for applying "Fortfall der Geschiiftsgrundlage," i. e., holding it to be, in the presence of profound economic disturbances, a
lating to "Unmiglichkeit der Leistung" (impossibility of performance). These are the
categories: "objektive nnmdglichkeit" (initial impossibility, i.e., where no one can perform) and "subjektive" (i.e., personal inability of the debtor or obligor to perform),
"rechtliche" (legal) and "tatsiichliche" (actual or physical); "urspriingliche" (original)
and "nachtrdgliche" (subsequent) ; "dauernde" (permanent) and "voriibergehende" (transient). These distinctions are attacked as artificial and unrealistic. Wolf contends that
the underlying doctrine of Sec. 242 BGB ("Treu und glauben") is sufficiently broad
and is based on such a concrete and personalized conception of "impossibility" as to encompass any type, without need for reference to the above noted theoretical distinctions embodied in §§ 275, 280, 306 and 323 of the BGB. (Ernst Wolf, "Ein Wort zum
Unmdglichkeits problem" 8 NEUE Jvis. WocEMN., 11 (Germany, Jan. 7, 1955)).
41 §§ 346-361.
42 § 242 BGB reads: "The debtor is bound to effect performance according to
the requirements of good faith, common habits being duly taken into consideration."
Corollary to § 242, in the matter of interpretation of contracts are §§ 133 and 157.
Section 133 reads: "In the interpretation of a declaration of intention, the true intention of the parties is to be sought without regard to the literal meaning of the expression." Section 157 reads: "Contracts should be interpreted according to the requirements of good fath, ordinary usage being taken into consideration."
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breach of good faith for any creditor to insist that the contract
be upheld in its original form, since it would call for sacrifices by a
debtor beyond the requirements of good faith ("opfergrenze") and
was not to be expected ("unzumutbar").

4

1

Thus by the combined

effect of the doctrines of Geschiftsgrundlage, of economic impossibility, and the greatly extended scope of application of Sec. 242, described
as the Civil Code counterpart of equity's power to mold suitable remedies," German courts began to adjudicate the mass of cases arising
out of economic strain and war emergencies;
(g) the perversion of the doctrine of "Geschftsgrundlage" during the Nazi regime as a means of dissolving contracts, pension agreements, etc.;
(h) as a supplement to the doctrine of "Geschaiftsgrundlage," and
as an administrative measure to handle the mass litigation which threatened the enactment on November 30, 1939, of the Decree on
Judicial Assistance in respect of contracts ("Vertragshilfeverordnung"). Under an administrative procedure, judges of the Amstgerichte (local courts) were empowered in certain classes of cases to
amend contracts by granting time for performance and permitting
installment payments.45
Following the surrender on May 8, 1945, cases involving impossibility of performance due to war conditions or prohibition by Nazi
decrees, began to accumulate.4" A major economic chapter in post43 1 MANuAL oF GFRmN LAW,

General Introduction, Civil and Commercial Law,

par. 194(d), 61 (London 1950).
44 Id. at 195(d), 62.
45 See note 38 supra at 24. Writing in 1946, Cohn, after noting the inadequacy of
the decree on Judicial Assistance to deal with the total collapse of Germany at the war's
end, despite extension of that decree to the United States Zone and makeshift decisions
and decrees in other occupied zones, stated: ". . . the present situation will undoubtedly
require more far-reaching measures than have been devised in the past. There is little doubt
that the courts will have to be given wider powers than they ever had before. Only this
can enable them to deal with a situation that is, it seems, without precedent in the legal
history of Europe." A useful comparative survey of public international law aspects
of war-disrupted or frustrated private contracts between enemy nationals, with brief
observations on judicial remedies in England, France and the United States is found
in Aubin, Die Offentliche rechtliche Einwirkung des Krieges auf privat Vorkriegsvertriige mit Feindbeziehung, 18 ZrrscHurrT PuR AUSLANDISCHS UND INTERNATIONALES
PRIVATkcECT, 922-973 (1953).
46 A review of the jurisprudence on "Unmgglichkeit" during the period between
May 8, 1945 and March 1947, is found in Haun, Die Behandlung von Forderungen und
Schulden aus der Zeit vor dem 8-5-45 (March 1947) reviewed in 1 NEuE JuRIs. WoCHEN.
221 (1947-1948). Haun supports the doctrine of direct judicial intervention and modification of contractual relationships as the basis for the successful handling of frustrated contract cases.
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World War II history was opened by the enactment of the 1948 currency reform. West Germany began her rapid return to industrial production and to the world market. Increasing volume of international
transactions revived interest in the problem of the protection of rights
of German sellers."'
2.

THE LAw OF

MARCH 26, 1952:

"VERTRAGSHILFE"

(JuDIc AL ASSISTANCE)

The continuing problem of cases involving "fortfall der geschiftsgrundlage," especially those in which payment in pre-1948 Reichsmarks was called for, produced the most important enactment since
the 1939 Judicial Assistance decree. This law of March 26, 1952"Gesetz Uiber die richterliche Vertragshilfe (Vertragshilfegesetz),148 repealed and modified the pre-existing legislation in this field.49 Only
pre-conversion date contracts i. e., entered into before June 21, 1948
(when the German currency reform was instituted) are affected by
this law, whether or not the medium of payment was Reichsmarks
or other currency. The judge on the application of the debtor (who
must establish that he attempted first to settle his obligation with his
creditor), is granted power to extend or suspend the times of pay47 For a comparison of German, English, French and American concepts and
statutory provisions protecting sellers by granting them rights to retain possession and
to reserve title to goods sold and delivered in installments in cases of defaulted payments (important to German sellers in foreign trade where the governing law problem of "lex rei sitae" arises) see, Schenk, Zur frage der sicherung des Verkaufers bei
Export-und-Import geschaften (inhesondere der Eigentumsvorbehalt) 3 NEUE JURIs.
WoCHEN. 248 (1950).
48 BGB, Part I, 198.
49 Evidently there-was considerable opposition to this law on the ground that the
whole concept and the implementing administrative machinery of "Vertragshilfe" judicial (contract) "assistance" or "alleviation", was alien to German laws and institutions,
and should be wholly abandoned. The proponents of this legislation acclaimed its
utilization, indeed urged an enlargement of the previous law. See Schubart, Das neue
Vertragshilfegesetz, 5 NE~u JUaxS. WOCHEN. 445-447 (1952), summarizing the main
provisions of the 1952 legislation. Criticism of the working of the law, in so far as it
affects mortgage claims is found in Loschhorn, Die behandlung der hypothekenforderungen in Vertragshilfegesetz, 1952, 5 NEuE Jusis. WocnmN. 1362 (1952). For comment
on the growing case law on "Vertragshilfegesetz, 1952," see Vahlen, Vertragshilegesetz
Korninentar v. E. Saage, 1952, (reviewed in 5 NEUE JuRas. WocnMN. 1366 (1952).
Also, Beck, Vertragshifegesetz, Kurskommentar v. Duden u. Roswedder, 6 NEUE Jusis.
WOCHEN. 174 (Germany, 1953), in which, among other arguments in support of the
law, the point is made that it is not, as its opponents have claimed, an indirect insolvency or bankruptcy procedure. For the impact of the law respectively upon German war-time procurement contracts and credits, see Hauer, Die Abwicklung der Warenund-Geldkredite aus der Kriegszeit, 6 NEUE Ju~is. WOCHEN. 321 (1953), and Coing,
Planwirt Sclhaftliche Vertrge inbesondere Riistungskredite in Vertragshilfeverfahren, 6
NEUE JUPuS. WOcMEN. 1326 (1953).
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ment or reduce the requirements for performance in certain classes
of cases (including contracts for installment deliveries) when it appears that the times for performance or full performance, if insisted
on, would not result in an equitable balancing of interests between
the parties.
Jurisdiction of the Judge ("Vertragshilferichter") under the 1952
law extends presumably only to cases in which both parties are German nationals. What of those numerous situations where one of the
parties to a contract for delivery of goods in installments (disrupted
or frustrated due to the outbreak of war) was German and the other
non-German? The London Agreement of February 1953,50 arranging for the settlement of pre-war German external private debts, is
silent on the important question as to whether or not pre-war contracts for delivery of goods or for services are to be considered discharged or continued in effect. This gap has raised questions of some
difficulty for German debtors as to reimbursement of sums paid
by way of down payments, installments or part payments in such contracts. 51 In the absence of a specific provision, it would seem that
such issue as continuation or discharge of these contracts would be
determined under private international law rules of the forum fixing
the governing law.52 Under German law, prepayment cases5 3 grow50 Agreement on German External Debts, London, February 27, 1953-(-B -G. B.,
1953, Part II, 331-367).
51 See the treatment of this intricate problem in Erler, Vertragsauflusung,Bezahlung
und Anzahlungsruckgewiihr bei Vorkriegslieferungsvertragen nach dem Londoner Aiislandsschuldenabkommen, 7 NauL JuRis. WocEN~.
9 (1954). Also, Wolff, Grundsiitze der internationalen Regiung der Deutschen dusseren Vorkreigsschulden, 6 NEuE
JuRis. Wocrtw. 1408 (1953); and-K-oegand Luther, Zur Reglung dei privat Ausschnlden nach dem Londoner Schuldenabkommen, 6 Naun JuRrs. WocnExr. 1652 (1953).
52 Erler, see note 51 supra at 10, cites (a) as the British concepts applicable in the
solution of these cases, the doctrines of implied condition ("Stillschweigende freizeichnung") and essential frustration-i. e., resulting from supervening impossibility or illegality ("nachkolgender unm~glichkeit oder ungesetzlichkeit") and the extinction of the
contract at the outbreak of the war;
(b) for the American principles applicable (which Erler claims resemble those announced
by German courts in comparable cases during World War Iand II, p. 10, n. 15), the case of
Neumond v. Farmers Feed Co., 244 N. Y. 202, 155 N. E. 100 (1926), where the Court of
Appeals held that a contract between a German company and an American company made
before the war, but left uncompleted and executory due to its outbreak, was terminated and payments owing the German plaintiff would not be required because
mutual obligations had not been fulfilled, "when the essential purpose of the parties would be thwarted by delay or the business efficacy or value of their bargain
materially impaired." (LEiamA, J. at p. 206). It is interesting that though the Neumond case did not mention "frustration," it has been cited as based on that doctrine
in Pacific Trading Co. v. Mouton Rice Milling Co., 184 F. 2d 141, at 148 (8th Cir.
1950);

(c) as to French doctrine, Erler claims that it tends to great conservatism in
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ing out of incompleted delivery situations would be governed by Secs.
323 and 818(3) of the German Civil Code. Sec. 323 applies to "reciprocal" contracts ("gegenseitige vertr~ige") where, in the intention
of the parties, the performance of each party constitutes the equivalent of the other party's performance 4 and should performance become impossible and neither party is responsible for the impossibility,
both parties are discharged. However, if the counter-performance has
already been made, it can be reclaimed under Sec. 323(3), in accordance with the rules of unjust enrichment. 5
3.

THE LONDON AGREEMENT OF FEBRUARY

1953

AND

"VERTRAGSHILFE"

Of particular importance in cases where the pre-payments were
made to German sellers of goods on installment deliveries under prewar contracts, would be Sec. 818(3) which provides that "the obligation to return or to make good the value is excluded where the recipient is no longer benefited."5 6 It is interesting to note further that the
London Agreement" (Annex IV, Art. 15--"Settlement of disputes")
provides that the dispute as to the existence or amounts of any claims
decreeing dissolution of contracts, though there is a similarity, he believes, between
"l'imprivision" ("Nichtvoranssehbarkeit") and the German doctrine of "Wegfall der
Geschlftsgrundlage." See, also, Larenz, Geschdftsgrundlage und Vertrageserfillung, reviewed in 6 NEur Juas. Wocu-mr. 654 (1953), and Larenz, Zum Wegiall der Geschiiftsgrundlage, 5 NEuE JuRis. WocHEN. 361 (1952).
53 Annex IV, Art. 27 of the London Agreement (p. 446, BGB, 1953, Part II,
p. 446), relating to "claims arising out of prepayments for supplies of goods and services," urges settlement of such claims but in default thereof calls for payments either
in installments or in full. Whether or not in circumstances of supervening impossibility
or illegality such prepayments as a matter of law should be made, can of course be
determined only by applying the substantive law of the forum on this subject. Erler,
see note 51 supra at 12.
54 MAguAL or GERmAN1
LAW, note 43, supra at 72, § 215.
55 Id. at 77, § 225(a).
56 German Civil Code, Unjustified Benefits, §§ 812-822, at 177-182 (English Translation by Wang, London 1907).
Where the seller of machines in what later became the Russian zone, received
in January 1943 from the West Zone buyer, 22,000 marks, the full purchase price, and
later, due to war restrictions was unable to deliver the machines and in October 1943,
returned only 16,000 marks to the buyer, who claimed the balance of 6,000 marks the
OLG Braunschweig held valid the claim of unjust enrichment, and rejected seller's
defense that under § 818(3) BGB, he was no longer enriched due to the seizure of
his plant by the Russians, because, as the court held, prior to the seizure in May
1945, the defendant had had the use and benefit of that balance of 6,000 marks for
other purposes of his business than that of manufacturing machines for plaintiff (which
was never done). Also, § 242 BGB was rejected as a defense. (OLG Braunschweig,
:FUR DEUTsCHEs RECHT 256
#100. 1. Zwilsevat-6-1-48. I U 130/47). 2 MonATscmu
(1948)).
57 Annex IV, art. 15 "Settlement of Disputes." BGB, Part II, 443 (1953).
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shall be decided by a court of law or a court of arbitration agreed
upon by the parties "which is competent in view of the legal relationship between the parties." Further, the "Hardship clause " s grants
relief to a debtor "whose financial position has been affected by war
or other extraordinary conditions to such an extent that the debtor
cannot be expected to settle his obligations in accordance with the
conditions and within the time limits laid down in this settlement proposal." This would seem to be an express recognition and adoption
of the "Opfergrenze-unzumutbarkeit" doctrine implicit in Sec. 242 of
the German Civil Code ("Treu und Glauben") that a debtor cannot
be expected to make the sacrifices otherwise called for, where insistence by the creditor would be outside the boundaries of good faith.
Article 11 of the London Agreement provides equitable relief in
the light of the debtor's "special circumstances" and "in accordance
with the concessions which the debtor has been or may be granted by
a German creditor on similar grounds under the legislation for the
relief of debtors ("Vertragshilferecht"). Where there is a disagreement, "a competent German court shall make a decision." Creditors
are given the right to appeal, or after an unfavorable court decision,
to resort to the Court of Arbitration set up by Annex IV, Art. 17.11
4.

"VERTRAGSHILFE" AND JUDICIAL REVISION

In all of this development, fundamental issues of judicial process
and decision are at stake.6"
The enlarged statutory role of the German judge in reconstituting or readjusting contract relationships following economic catastrophe has not been accepted without considerable opposition and alarm
among German jurists for the integrity of the postulate "pacta sunt
servanda."61 There is evidence, however, of a determination to confine
58 Annex IV, art. 11 "Settlement of Disputes." BGB, Part 1, 441 (1953).
59 Annex IV, art. 15 "Settlement of Disputes." BGB, Part II, 443 (1953).
60 For an essay of extraordinary penetration and concision on this fluid and complex problem, see von Mehren, The Judicial Process in the United States and Germany-A Comparative Analysis, in Band I of FEsTscmuzr FihR En sT RAE.r.-RECITsNMG UND INTERNATI NALEs PRIVATREOnT, 68-98 (Tiibingen 1954). While emVERoU
phasizing that the extremely involved nature of the problem precludes any sweeping
generalizations, von Mehren suggests that the tendency towards judicial law-making
seems much less marked in Germany at the present time than in the United States.
61 For a vigorous attack on the abuses of German judicial assistance under the
aegis of the pre-war and post-war "Vertragshilfe" legislation as constituting (in Roscoe
Pound's phrase, "socialization of private law"), see Neumayer, Die Richterliche

Abdnderung Notleidender Geldverbindlichkeiten (Vertragshilje) und ihre Kritik, 4 Mo652-655 (1950). Also( Sieg, Korrektur von Rechts-

NATsCHRIIT FuR DEUTSCHES RECnT,

geschdften durcls den Prozessrichter,4 NEUE Juis. WOCHEN. 507 (1951).
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"judicial assistance" strictly to cases of "Wegfall der geschliftsgrundlage" (disappearance of the basis for the business relationship) and
to resist the application of Sec. 242 of the Civil Code as a justification
for judicial revision of contracts contrary to the express intention of
the parties. 2
Proponents of the "Vertragshilfegesetz" of 1952 would doubtless
argue that in the presence of economic ruin, insistence on a strict application of "pacta sunt servanda" is unrealistic and inhuman. Professor Corbin has made the pungent observation: "'FIAT JUSTITIA
RUAT COELUM'-a phrase impressive mainly because of its being
in Latin and not understandable. When the skies begin to fall, Justice removes the blindfold from her eyes and tilts the scales." 3 It will
be interesting to see whether the opponents of Vertragshilfe, during
the present cycle of West Germany's economic prosperity will be able
to persuade German courts once more to return the blindfold.
D. Swiss LAW
THE right of the judge to intervene and revise a private contract
is recognized in principle under Swiss law."s The basis of this power
is Article 2 of the Swiss Civil Code which governs the case of a palpable abuse of a right. Demand for performance is held to be such an
abuse if, because of a drastic change in the economic situation, not
foreseeable at the date of the execution of a contract, insistence on performance would mean unjust enrichment of the creditor at the expense
of the debtor.0 5 The concept of unjust enrichment and its remedial
62 See the decision of the Bundes Gerichte Hof of April 22, 1953-11 Z R 143/52
(Hamm), reported in 6 NEu 3Juais. WocHNa. 937-938 (1953), in which the court
held that while a judge may, in the absence of an express provision in a contract which
has been fully executed, supply and put into effect the necessary term, he may not on
the basis of § 242 BGB ("Treu und glauhen") do so, if the actual result will produce
such a modification of the other terms of the contract as would call for action by the
parties wholly contrary to their expressed intentions.
63 Professor Corbin's 80th Birthday, 71 L. Q. REv. 203 (1955).
64 Sm om-us, QUELQUES REmARQUEs sur LA CAUSE DES OBLIGATIONS EN DROIT SUISSE,
Etudes de droit civil i la memoire de Henry Capitant 175 (Paris, 1939), referred to in
Gow, supra, note 8 at 316-318. There is of course the famous Art. 1(2) (3) of the Swiss
Civil CQde which states that "where no provision is applicable, the judge shall decide
according to the existing customary law, and in default thereof, according to the rules
which he would lay down if he had himself to act as legislator. Herein he must be
guided by approved legal doctrine and case law." This "freie richterliche ermessen"
(free judicial discretion) is exercised in cases involving determination of quantum and
distribution of damages and especially in unjust enrichment cases. (Arts. 62-67 of The
Swiss Federal Code of Obligations). See Guir, DAs SciwE miscEm OBLIGATIONS-

RECHT, 72, 166 (Germany 1948).
65 Swiss Civil Code, Art. 2(2) at 1. "The law does not sanction the evident abuse

of a man's rights."

(English version by Ivy Williams, Oxford 1925.)
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correlative, restitution, are implemented in Articles 62-67 of the Swiss
Law of obligations and in other articles dealing with impossibility of
performance. 6 Supervening illegality, as in other jurisdictions, is a
complete defense to an action for breach of an installment sale contract. Impossibility of performance resulting from such illegality discharges the obligor or debtor under Art. 119(1)--"An obligation is
discharged to the extent of its becoming impossible by circumstances
for which the debtor cannot be made responsible."
Illustrating the application of Art. 119, in the context of an international sale contract (though the element of restitution was lacking) is an interesting case decided by the "Graubiinden Kantonsgericht" :67 B ordered 150 bales of textiles from an Italian firm for delivery, from January 13 through March 20, 1941. January 14, B sold
the goods to M. H. Pursuant to the delivery schedule, B received 36
bales from the Italian seller, which he then turned over to M. H.
February 21, 1941, the Italian finance ministry prohibited the export
of these textiles without a license. Due to excessive delay (imposed
on the Italian manufacturer by his government) in procuring an export
license, defendant B was unable to meet the delivery schedule (delivery of the balance of 114 bales to M. H. at the Swiss-Italian border
by March 20, 1941). The court held that the impossibility of performance of the Italian seller was likewise the impossibility of performance of B, vis-h-vis his buyer M. H. This "Ausfuhrverbot" (prohibition against export) was the basis for the defense of impossibility
due to supervening illegality ("rechtlichliche Unm~glichkeit der erfiilung"). Further, the court held that the defense of impossibility
was strengthened by evidence that B had made efforts but had failed
to buy goods within Switzerland to replace those not delivered, at
66 Art. 119 (Impossibility of performance), Art. 20 (Void contracts) and Art. 21
(Unconscionable contracts) pp. 85 and 18 respectively in WErrSTEm, THE SwIss FED-

(Zurich 1928); Arts. 62-67 incl. Id. at 47-51, cover obligations resulting from unjustifiable enrichment ("l'enrichissement illegitime," "ungerechtfertigter Bereicherung"). For an authoritative treatment of these important articles
see, Guhl, see note 64 supra at 36, 48-49, 162-169, 178, 224. The role of the judge in
handling private contract litigation affected by Swiss war-time price regulations in the
light of Art. 20(1) of the Federal Code of Obligations (Contracts yoid because they
contain inpossible, illegal or contra bonos mores provisions) is discussed in Stahel,
Der Einfluss der Verletzung Kriegswirtschaftlicher Vorschriften auf die zivilrechtliche
Gidtigkeit der Vertrage, 40 SCHWErZERUSCHE JRisTENZErTu7NG, 213-219 (July 15, 1944),
and Leuman, PrivatrechtlicheSanktionen des Kriegswirtschaftsrechts,39 ScHwEIZaiUsCHE
237-242 (Feb. 15, 1943).
JURIsTENZEITUN,
ERAL CODE OF OBLIGATIONS

67 June 20, 1947, Granbiinden K. G.; reported in 47 SctVEIZEmsCHE JuIUSTEN-

ZEITUNG,

79-80 (1951).
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prices no higher than those fixed in his Italian contract. This was an
"objektive unm6glichkeit der Erfiillung," for which B, in view of the
unforeseeability of the issuance of the Italian decree, and despite his
efforts at replacement of the goods, was not responsible. B was therefore discharged of liability under Art. 119(1).
E. LATIN-AMERICAN LAW
LATIN-AMERICAN jurisprudence generally has been influenced by
the French theory of 'Timpr~vision". While the cases evidently are
scanty, civil and commercial code provisions68 in such countries as
Uruguay, Argentina and Mexico, for example, when read together,
have produced a moderation or attenuation of the strict rule of "pacta
sunt servanda". These codes cover situations where unforeseeable largescale economic disaster, or supervening illegality in the form of governmental decrees have made performance impossible, or where insistence on strict performance could result in unjust enrichment
of the creditor or financial ruin of the debtor. The trend seems also
to be in the direction of enlarging the judge's power 69 to intervene, in
68 Couture, Frustration of Contract in Uruguayan Law, 28-29 J. Comp. LEG. &
INT'L L. 13-15 (3d Series, 1946-1947). Azevedo, Frustrationof Contract in Latin-American Law and Particularlyin Brazil, 28-29 J. CoMp'. LEG. & INT'L L. 15-19 (3d Series,

1947). Impossibility, force majeure, good faith between contracting parties, interpretation in doubtful cases in a debtor's favor, and other meliorating provisions are
found, for example, in Arts. 1271, 1283, 1291, 1293, 1304 and 1549 of the Uruguayan
Civil Code, and Art. 1009 of the Commercial Code. Arts. 1828, 1293 and 2111 of
the Mexican Civil Code govern impossibility and Arts. 1882-1895 lay down rules on unjust enrichment. In Argentina, Arts. 513, 514 and 819 of the Civil Code relieve debtors
or obligors of liability on the occurrence of fortuitous events or those caused by force
majeure. Art. 514 reads: "A fortuitous event (force majeure) is one which could not
have been foreseen or which having been foreseen, could not have been avoided." Force
majeure was rejected as a defense in an action for breach of contract made in February
1942 to sell iron (the seller having purchased it in the United States which was then
at war). War, the court held, is not of itself a fortuitous event or force majeure, except
when, as a result thereof, it is materially impossible to fulfill the obligation, which
was not the case here since the country of origin of the iron was not mentioned as
a condition in the contract. Jose Ferrarini v. Porto y Cia, J. A. 1949, 9 (Sept.
30 1948).
69 Fonseca, note 17 supra, concludes his analysis of "La force obligatoire des contrats" at 127: "La tendance du droit moderne n'est plus le maintien rigide de law force
obligatoire des contrats

. .

2' and cites Arts. 1467-1469 of the Italian Civil Code as

models for legislation in other countries.
Art. 1467 reads: "Contracts calling for mutual performance-In contracts of continuous or periodic performance or of delayed performance, if the performance of one
of the parties has become excessively onerous due to the occurrence of extraordinary
unforeseeable events, the party which owes such performance can demand the cancellation of the contract with the effects established by Article 1458. The cancellation
cannot be demanded if the supervening burdensome factor falls within the normal
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appropriate cases of supervening impossibility, so as to restore
the economic balance between the parties. Differences of opinion
as to the extent and scope of the judge's revisionary powers exist
among Latin-American students of the problem."0 The cleavage, (in
7
Brazil) parallels the lines of division on the continent. '
risk of the contract. The party against whom the cancellation is demanded can avoid
it by offering to modify the conditions of the contract in an equitable manner."
Art. 1468: "Contract with obligations on the part of only one party-In the
hypothesis assumed in the preceding article, if there is concerned a contract in which
only one of the parties has assumed obligations, such party can request a reduction
of his performance or a modification of the terms of performance, sufficient to make
it equitable again."
Art. 1469: "Aleatory contract-The provisions of the preceding articles do not
apply to contracts which are aleatory in their nature, or by the intent of the parties."
70 Azevedo, note 68 suPra, at 18-19, makes a strong plea for judicial intervention
in Brazil in cases of supervening impossibility to round out the acceptance by the
courts of that country of the theory of "'imprdvision," and cites a proposal in 1941
of the Committee to revise the Brazilian Civil Code (not enacted yet by the Brazilian
Parliament) to include an explicit delegation of such power to judges at the debtor's
or obligor's request, in cases of exceptional and unforeseeable difficulties in performance
which might result in excessive loss to him, to modify the terms.
71 Fonseca, see note 68 supra at 123, while citing a number of cases of the
Brazilian courts, which pursuant to special decrees, have recognized and applied
the theory of "'imprdvision," contends that under the Civil Code alone, the "revisionist" point of view could not easily be put into effect in Brazil, because of various
severe restrictions on the judge's powers to delay payments of a debtor, to change the
price, or in other ways, modify the terms of a contract, and citing Arts. 1214, 1246
and 1433 as illustrations of inhibitions on judicial discretion, Brazilian special decree
legislation since 1933, Fonseca points out has exhibited a tendency contrary to
the Code, i.e., to regulate prices, rents, loan rates, agricultural obligations and profits,
in the public interest, and to prevent "i'abus de droit." Following the lead of the
"anti-revisionist" Ripert, Fonseca warns against the undue extension of judicial discretion (despite the need for preserving the principle of unjust enrichment), as
a threat to the integrity of private contracts and as a means of undermining the basic
concept of good faith in contractual relationships. It is significant that Art. 5 of the
Brazilian decree law of September 4, 1942 ("Introduction to the Brazilian Code") expressly requires judges in applying the laws, "to keep in mind their social purposes
and the exigencies of the public interest."
]fn Puerto Rico (despite earlier rejection of "l'imprdvision" as a means of solving
the problem of a contract interrupted or made impossible of performance by unforeseeable occurrences or conditions) recent decisions in that jurisdiction decreeing restitution in such cases, as well as Spanish and Puerto Rican commentators, seem to favor
adoption of the doctrine. The confuison has been pointed out in the Puerto Rican
decisions, as to the inaccurate and interchangeable use of "'imprdvision" and "el casco
Jortuito" (Act of God). This is illustrated in the recent decision in Lopez v. Carolina,
75 Dec. P. R. 479 (1953); liability of a municipality building an aqueduct, to a contractor who had dug two wells needed for it, but who had failed to obtain certificates
of potability of the water from the pertinent government agencies. The commentator
notes the favorable attitude of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico in the Lopez case,
which in applying the doctrine of restitution, buttressed by Arts. 1210, 1227, 1235 of
the Civil Code of Puerto Rico governing performance of contracts, leaves the door
open to the eventual incorporation of "l'imprivision" into Puerto Rican jurisprudence.
Calderon, Jr., La imprivision, el caso fbrtzuito y el caso Rodriguez Lopez v. Muncipio
de Carolina,24 REvisTA JUMIICA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE PUERTO Rico 171-179 (1954).
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III. CONCLUSION
CASES involving breaches of international sales contracts brought
about by supervening illegality (government decree, "fait du prince")
offer a peculiarly inviting opportunity for application of the comparative method to a sharply limited field.72 The parties may be nationals of two or more countries with differing bodies of contract or
commercial laws, yet disruption of performance, suspension of deliveries, incompleted or prohibited payments, or other factors, present
basically the same practical, as well as juridical, problems for solution in each legal system. Thus, sellers and buyers in foreign commerce constitute a unity, as well as a potential diversity, of economic
interest upon which certain universally recognized, but variously applied judicial concepts are brought to bear.
In this sketch of restricted scope, the attempt has been made
to identify, not so much the common substantive elements, as the
remedial elements of various legal systems when handling the problem
of frustrated contracts. This essay was undertaken in the more modest spirit of the comparative method, in Arminjon's phrase, as a "disT S in the hope that it would serve as a spur for a
cipline auxiliaire,"
more penetrating study of the deeply interrelated problems of freedom of contract in the sphere of international transactions and legislative and judicial revisionism--"le dirigisme contractuel." 74
Within the narrow factual context there are presented partly performed international sales contracts frustrated by government decree-we find observance in all legal systems of the underlying principle of impossibility of performance---"impossibilium nulla obligatio."
Starting with antithetical premises as to when impossibility or illegality may be accepted as a defense, both common law and civil law
systems reach virtually the same results in the cases 5 by applying the
72 GUTTERIDGE, COMPARATIVE LAW, 32-34 (2d ed., Cambridge 1949). The writer
has been guided by Rabel's admonition, ". . . Again, comparative work on concrete

legal problems (as contrasted with methodology or legal philosophy) has often failed
when extended to abstract theories. For quite a time, our task will be enormous, even
if restricted to rules and facts. One of the first lessons a comparative student is likely

to learn, is how much more readily judicial decisions on analogous case situations can
be compared than statutes and doctrines. . .

."

Rabel, The Hague Conference on the

Unification of Sales Law, I Am. J.CouP. L. 58 at 67 (1952).
73 AaR.Njo , NOIDE AND WoLr,

1 TRAITi DE DROIT comPARE 22 (France, 1950).
74 This phrase is attributed to Josserand by Fonseca, see note 17 supra, at 115.
75 6 WmSTON, CONTRACTS, § 1979, 5563, 5564 (New York 1936-1938); 2 Ar-

minjon, see note 73 supra at 36; 3 Id. at 82, 143-146. See, also, Gorla, The Theory of
Object of Contract in Civil Law: A Critical Analysis by Means of the Comparative
Method, 28 TULANE L. REV. 443-461, at 460 (1954).
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motion of "frustration" (as in England, but sparsely employed in the
United States) "imprvision" or "Unzumutbarkeit." Further, the principles of unjust enrichment and restitution are actively applied in both
systems when working out readjusted contractual relationships and
obligations in the form of redistributed risks.7" Nevertheless, a major
divergence has developed in the area of the nature and scope of judicial revision of frustrated contracts. Far-reaching economic disasters
flowing from the two World Wars have produced a drastic enlargement of judicial power in code countries. The judicial process in those
countries, under the strain of post-war economic reconstruction, is employed as an instrument of public policy in the quasi-administrative
readjustment of private contract obligations whose performance had
become legally impossible or economically ruinous. Judges, under such
recently enacted statutes, or amended civil codes, are empowered to
handle war-generated currency-inflation litigation, arising from incompleted contracts for sales of goods, much as an international commercial arbitrator acting under a mandate to make a complete readjustment of all the rights and obligations of the parties. 77
76 The concept of unjust enrichment is strongly defended (p. 65) by LORD DENrin his little book, THE CnuArionr LAW (London 1953), as a powerful means to
break down "the straight jackets of contract and tort" into which the courts have
been forced to fit all remedies. But there is still doubt whether unjust enrichment
as yet forms a part of the common law of England. Reading v. A. F., [1951] A. C.
507 at 513. Corbi4 states: ". . . When an actually unforeseen event had caused a promised performance to be impossible or has increased or decreased its cost or value and
the risks involved cannot be shown by a process of factual 'interpretation' to have
been allocated by the parties themselves, the Court must determine their allocation
in accordance with the opinions of men in general as evidenced by business practice
and social mores. Such a judicial allocation is always a subdivision of risks. As nearly as may be feasible, the parties are restored to the status quo ante. The judicial
remedy is restitution, not enforcement. .. ."
The courts of today-the successors of the Chancellors of yesterday-have full
power to fashion their judgments and decrees as the justice of the time requires." Corbin,
Frustration of Contract in the United States of America, 28-29 J. Comp. LEa. &
INT'L L., Parts III-IV, 1-8 (3d Series, 1946-1947). In a footnote (19), Professor Corbin adds: "It did not require a Frustration of Contracts Act to confer this power
upon the Courts ...
"
77 For an acute analysis of the contrasted roles of the Anglo-American and French
judges in the application of State-interventionist public policy in the field of private
contract, see LLOYD, PUBLIC PoLc, A COmPARATmVE STUDY IN ENGLISH AND FRFNcn
LAW, 2, 3, 7, 121, 122 (London 1953).
In England Lord Wright and Lord Denning are proponents of the frank recognition of judicial law-making. In the preface of his book THE CmnAoxNo LAW, see note
75 supra at vii, Loan DENNTINO states: "In theory, the judges do not make law, they
only expound it. But as no one knows what the law is until the judges expound it,
it follows that they make it." At p. 45: ". . . The truth is that they (the judges) do
every day make law, though it is almost heresy to say so." But the debate still rages
in England: Lora Simonds, in Magor v. Newport Corp., [19521 A. C. 189 at 191,
NIImG
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In common law jurisdictions, though despite its reality, the principle of judicial legislation (exercised in practical effect to "remake"
contracts for the parties) 7" is still piously denied. The courts by implementing the doctrines of unjust enrichment and restitution, have
nevertheless reached similar equitable results where problems of part
payments or incompleted deliveries were presented. In the United
States, "frustration" has been given halting recognition and is simply
merged with "impossibility of performance",7 9 or applied in the dis80
guised form of "failure of consideration.1

On the international level, a synthesis of the various conceptions
in common law and code systems relating to the bases for recognizing
an obligor's defense of frustration by unforeseeable events as an excuse
for non-performance is found in Art. 77 of the "Revised Draft of a
Uniform Law on InternationalSales of Goods."8 Intention of the pardenounced Lord Denning's position in that case when it was in the Court of Appeal,
that "courts must fill in the gaps in statutes," as "a naked usurpation of the legislative function under the thin disguise of interpretation."
78 Denning, see note 76, supra at 60, notes the growing tendency of the English
courts not only to set aside contracts for mistake, but also "to review the whole transaction and determine the rights of the parties as practical justice seem to demand."
McElroy and Williams have suggested that "failure of consideration" offers the best
approach to the solution of problems of supervening impossibility and until the "coronation cases" the English courts were in -the process of "developing the principle."
Gow, see note 8 supra at 302, 303.
79 In New York, it has been held that supervening acts of government which
render "performance impossible," excuse the seller from performance as a matter of
law (Matter of Kramer & Uchitelld, Inc., 288 N. Y. 467 (1942), but in General Aniline & Film Corp. v. Bayer, 64 N. Y. S. 2d 492, aff'd, 305 N. Y. 479 (1953), the lower
court mentioned frustration by supervening acts of the sovereign "as one of the elements in its decision on the sufficiency of a complaint, but the Court of Appeals
treated that defense simply as "impossibility of performance").
80 6 WIu=LsToN, COnTRACTS, § 1954, at 5480 (New York 1936-1938).
81 INT'L INsT. TOR THE UmnF. or PRIvATE LAW, "Unidroit" 32 (Rome, Ed. 1951).
Section II reads: "Where one of the parties has not performed one of his obligations,
he shall not be liable for such nonperformance, if he can prove that it was due to an,
impediment, which according to the intention of the parties, at the time of the conclusion of the contract, he was bound to contemplate, or to avoid or to overcome.
In the absence of an intention of the parties, regard shall be had to the intention which
is usual when similar parties are placed in an identical situation. When the impediment is such as to cause a temporary exemption, such exemption shall be deemed
permanent where an account of the delay in performance, its subsequent execution
will be so radically transformed as to have become the performance of an obligation
other than that contemplated by the contract. The exemption set out in this article
on behalf of one of the parties does not deprive the other party of his right to avoid
the contract or claim or a reduction of price where this law entitles him to avail
himself of either of these rights." The restitution principle is recognized in Art. 81
(Effects of Avoidance): "The avoidance of the contract releases both parties from their
obligations arising from it, subject to any damages which may be due. Where either
party has performed his part of the contract either wholly or partially, such party
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ties is considered decisive, but where no agreement is indicated, the
problem is reduced to one of interpretation according to techniques
developed in common law countries."2 The Report on the Draft8
(in commenting on the difficulty of reconciling opinions on the problem of steep increase in price levels, following unforeseeable change of
circumstances) states: ". . . But on closer study, these differences
arise from the way of looking at the extent of the typical risks which
sellers adopt. The formula of Art. 77 leaves all these notions intact
but reminds the judges that they must apportion to each party his
share of the risk by interpreting their empirical intention and not by
applying diverse doctrines of a dogmatic nature. Perhaps once this
common basis has been recognized, the decisions will become integrated to some extent. ' ' 4
may claim restitution from the other. Where there has been performance by both parties, each may withhold restitution until the other party shall make restitution l"
82 Report, REVISED DRAFT, see note 81 supra at 93-95.
83 Report, REVISED DRAFT, see note 81 supra at 95.
84 Rabel, see note 72, supra at 63, observing that no conceptual importance is attached in the draft to distinctions between absolute and relative impossibility, inability, frustration, etc., states: ". . . Also the finally adopted formulation of accidental events excusing a debtor (Art. 77) inspired by the succession of English cases,
although it was influenced by German generalizations and amounts to a cautious
'clausala rebus sic stantibus,' has been expressly approved." For a comparison between
the Uniform Commercial Code-Sales and the Draft of a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Movable Goods ("unidroit"), see, Keyes, Towards a Single Law Governing the International Sale of Goods-A Comparative Study, 42 CALIF. L. Rzv. 693
(1954).
The 1954 Activity Report of "Unidroit'"-IN'TL INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION
OF PRIvATE LAW, at p. 13 states that the Draft, having been given a most favorable
reception by the delegates of the governments and the "very satisfactory success
obtained by this first reading of the Draft, justifies the hope that one of the most
important efforts made in the direction of the unification of private law will be crowned
with success at no distant date."

